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Government Lawyers in the Liberal State
W. Bradley Wendel1

I.

Introduction: Getting the Clichés Out of the Way.

What does it mean for a government actor to lack the quality of independence?
Specifically, in connection with government lawyers, how should we understand core evaluative
notions like the distinction between neutrality and partisanship? These terms are used casually
as epithets — the Bush Justice Department’s independence was “shattered,” says one former
government lawyer2 and the Department’s process of vetting job candidates was widely decried
as “politicized” or “ideological.”3 Naturally the other side uses the same terms of abuse. The
2000 Republican Party platform complained bitterly that, “An administration that lives by
evasion, coverup, stonewalling, and duplicity has given us a totally discredited Department of
Justice . . . [and] the unprecedented politicization of decisions regarding both personnel and
investigations.”4 This sort of distinction, between politicization and impartiality, is not only
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Professor of Law, Cornell University. Thanks to the participants in the Yale Legal Theory Workshop,
workshops at the Queen’s University Faculty of Law and Dalhousie Law School, and the Cornell Law School
faculty retreat, for their helpful comments and criticism. For feedback above and beyond the call of duty, I am
grateful to Tsvi Kahana, Jeff Rachlinski, Mark Suchman, and Alice Woolley.
2
See Tony Mauro, Justice Department’s Independence Shattered, Says Former DOJ Attorney, LEGAL
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2007).
3
For a typical attack on the George W. Bush Administration, see John S. Koppel, Bush Justice is a
National Disgrace, DENVER POST (July 9, 2007) (op-ed piece by DOJ civil appellate attorney lambasting episodes of
“politicization” including the pardon of Scooter Libby, the abuse of warrantless surveillance, and the firing of U.S.
Attorneys).
4
Republican Party Platform of 2000, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849> (last
visited 12/11/07). Ted Olsen — who was then former Reagan Administration OLC head, and subsequently would
serve as Bush [43]’s Solicitor General — also excoriated the politicization of Clinton DOJ, including the FBI
investigation of the White House travel office and alleged interference with the investigation of the death of Vince
Foster. See Theodore B. Olson, Politicizing the Justice Department, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE WAKE OF
CLINTON 151 (Roger Pilon, ed., 2000).
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familiar in contemporary rhetoric, but has a long historical pedigree. George Washington is
reported to have said he was seeking a “neutral expounder of the law rather than a political
advisor” when he selected the nation’s first Attorney General.5 In the wake of the Watergate
scandal, Gerald Ford similarly lamented that “the Justice Department had become increasingly
politicized for a quarter of a century. But the problem had reached crisis proportions by the time
I became President.”6
Although the rhetorical power of this distinction is apparent, one does not have to push
the analysis very far before the line between impartial decision-making and bias becomes
uncertain. The reason for this is the fairly banal point that all government policies discriminate
in some way, and many discriminate on the basis of contestable values. It cannot be the case that
government decision-making has been impermissibly politicized just because the basis for the
decision happens to line up with the policy preferences of the incumbent President. In fact,
considerations of democratic accountability would seem to favor this outcome. Not only do
government policies discriminate, but government decision-makers act on the basis of reasons
that may also overlap with the preferences of one side or the other of a political divide. If it is
“partisanship” to base a decision on grounds that are congenial to Republicans and not to
Democrats, or vice-versa, then it would appear that most decisions made by government officials
are partisan. Therefore, there would seem to be no way to criticize coherently a government
actor for lacking the virtue of neutrality. Unsurprisingly, terms like neutrality, independence,
politicization, and partisanship are woefully undertheorized in the literature on government

5
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See Griffin B. Bell, Office of Attorney General’s Client Relationship, 36 BUS. LAW. 791, 791 (1981).
See Gerald R. Ford, In Memoriam: Edward H. Levi, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 975, 975 (2000).
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lawyers’ ethics.7

The basic problem of the ethical responsibilities of government lawyers is easy to state,
and generally well understood: The President has an agenda.8 People vote for presidential
candidates in part on the basis of ideology. Historically, and very roughly, if you want a
President who’s tough on crime, favors small government and limited spending, and believes in a
robust role for the military in foreign policy, you vote Republican; if, on the other hand, you
favor government intervention to ameliorate social problems, don’t mind redistributive taxation,
and prefer a more “humanitarian” foreign policy, you vote Democrat. The winner of the election
justifiably believes that he (maybe now she) has a mandate from voters to pursue a particular
political agenda. The President accordingly selects executive branch officials on basis of their
fealty to this agenda — again, not just because it is the President’s agenda, but because the
content of the agenda has been set by a democratically legitimate process. The responsibility of
these officials is, in part, to serve as agents of the President, faithfully executing the President’s

7

I do not mean that we cannot identify blatant examples of political inference with the what should be an
impartial process of decision-making. For example, Col. Morris Davis, the former chief prosecutor in the military
commissions at Guantánamo Bay, resigned after being placed under the command of William J. Haynes, the civilian
general counsel of the Department of Defense, who had previously indicated that acquittals in the commission
hearings would be intolerable. When Col. Davis noted there had been acquittals at Nuremberg, Haynes responded:
“If we’ve been holding these guys for so long, how can we explain letting them get off? We can’t have acquittals.
We’ve got to have convictions.” See Ross Tuttle, Rigged Trials at Gitmo, NATION (Feb. 20, 2008); see also William
Glaberson, Former Prosecutor to Testify for Detainee, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2008); Morris D. Davis, AWOL
Military Justice, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2007). If the concept of politicized decision-making means anything, this
must be an instance of it. The problem I want to pursue in this paper is that in interesting cases, not involving the
exercise of raw coercive power and obvious rigging of procedures, we do not have a promising way to theorize the
notion of politicization.
8
See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution: A Brief Positive
Account of the Role of Government Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 61, 66 (1998) (“American Presidents must, as a practical matter, have some kind of program for the Supreme
Court and for the legal system as a whole. . . . [A]ll Presidents must, as a political matter, have some goals in mind
while staffing the legal positions in their administrations.”).
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agenda.9 At the same time, however, all government officials have an obligation of fidelity to
the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The President takes an constitutionallyspecified oath to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.”10
Executive branch officials similarly are required to swear to support the Constitution.11 Lawyers
advise all of these executive branch officials on how to act in compliance with the law. In a
certain sense, to be explored in depth in this paper, federal government lawyers have an duty of
impartiality or neutrality with respect to Constitution and the framework of laws enacted by
Congress pursuant to its constitutional authority.12 Government lawyers who deviate too much
from their obligation of fidelity to the law are criticized for “politicizing” their conduct, implying
that it is possible to construct standards of impartiality that may be used as normative
benchmarks.

One place to turn for these benchmarks would be to the law itself. Consider how this
would work, with reference to a simple hypothetical: Suppose environmental protection statutes
provide that a species must be listed as endangered if it satisfies certain criteria; a certain species
of fish does in fact satisfy those criteria; the government official in charge of making the
determination that a species is endangered nevertheless refuses to list the fish as endangered,
because of an ideological commitment to deregulation and scaling back environmental protection

9

See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,106 COLUM. L. REV.
1189, 1194-95 (2006) (“[P]olitics has an entirely appropriate role in the executive branch. By this I mean
discretionary considerations of policy and even ideology, as opposed to the mandatory . . . constraints of legal
rules.”)
10
U.S. CONST., art. II, sec. 1.
11
Id., art. VI.
12
I am talking about federal government officials here, and will analyze issues of federal government
lawyers’ ethics throughout this paper, but the same analysis applies at the state level as well.
4

laws; and agency lawyers advising that official conclude that the decision is legally permissible,
again because the lawyer has an ideological preference for deregulation that causes the lawyer to
read the governing law tendentiously.13 We would, in this simple hypothetical case, be justified
in criticizing the lawyer for partisanship, politicized judgment, lack of independence and
impartiality, and the other ethical failings we sometimes attribute to government lawyers. (This
is true regardless of whether the lawyer is a political appointee or a “tenured” agency lawyer.14
Criticism of the partisanship of government lawyers extends to political appointees, implying
that there is a degree of partisanship that is intolerable even in non-tenured lawyers.) The
problem with this response is that I think we — that is, members of the legal academy, as a
profession — have lost faith in the belief that the law is determinate enough to serve as a
benchmark in this way. We doubt the part of the specification of the example which says, “The
statutes provide such-and-such.” Maybe there is a way to read the statutes to avoid the
conclusion that the fish must be listed as endangered. In addition to doubting the determinacy of
the law, and despite all the talk about the death of critical legal studies, we also remain unsettled
by the critical legal studies “critique of neutrality.” We accept, even if only tacitly, the CLS
contention that law is merely politics by other means. Thus, if the law is sufficiently
indeterminate that it can be manipulated to mean anything the client wants it to mean,15 there

13

This example is drawn loosely from a controversy involving Vice President Dick Cheney’s intervention
in a water dispute in the western United States. See Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST
(June 27, 2007), at A01.
14
See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1998).
15
See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION {FIN DE SIÈCLE}23 (1997) (“Judges,
moreover, always claim that they themselves are proceeding according to a discursive procedure that positively
excludes ideology . . .. Jurisprudence theorizes denial by explaining how adjudication can be nonideological.”);
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 242-53 (1987); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American
Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985); Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW 13 (David Kairys, ed., rev’d ed. 1990).
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would appear to be no good reason why the lawyer should not acquiesce in the demand of
politically appointed officials to resist listing the fish as endangered. This is a cynical reaction to
the traditional characterization of government lawyers as serving two masters — the President’s
political agenda and the law.16 The latter collapses all too easily into the former, because we no
longer accept old verities like “impartial justice,” neutrality, or impartial legal interpretation.
There can be no coherent way to criticize government lawyers for politicizing their role if there
is such thing as a neutral, apolitical interpretation of law. Worries about the ability to sustain the
“politicization” critique in a principled way are therefore a challenge for liberal political theory,
as well as the narrower concern of philosophical legal ethics.

The deeper theoretical problem, of which our inability to coherently sustain the
“politicization” critique is a part, is the tension between two ideals of self-government —
collective self-rule through majoritarian political processes, and the rule of law (or, in the case of
public law, constitutionalism).17 The separation of law and politics is at the heart of the liberal
ideal of the rule of law, which emphasizes the constraint on the arbitrary exercise of power by
restricting the state to acting through relative stable, determinate rules capable of being
ascertained in advance by citizens.18 The irony, and source of an endlessly fascinating

16

See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
OFFICE, 1789-1990 2-3 (1992) (citing numerous statements from past Attorneys General of the ideal of serving
“nonpartisan, evenhanded Justice” while also acting as the political adviser to the President).
17
See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1500-01, 1509, 1527 (1988).
18
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALITY 210, 213 (1979); F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). A few modern critics question this
formal conception of the rule of law, and argue that a system of norms must satisfy some substantive criteria, such
as adequately protecting human rights, to be worthy of the label “law.” See, e.g., Thomas Bingham (Baron of
Cornhill), The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67 (2007); Ronald Dworkin, Political Judges and the Rule of Law,
in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9 (1985).
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jurisprudential puzzle, is that this restriction on state power must be given effect by creating
some institution, itself part of the apparatus of the state, which acquires power by limiting the
power of other institutional actors. The strategy of constitutionalism vests courts with the
authority to invalidate the actions of the political branches, on the basis of entrenched rights, the
source of which is held to be some founding decision of We The People, embodied in an act of
collective self-constitution. It is to be expected, however, that interpretive questions might arise
concerning the scope and limits of the entrenched rights against majoritarian actions, that the
officials empowered to enforce the terms of the constitution will be making decisions that have a
profound impact on the lives of citizens, and that those affected citizens will wonder why they
should not have a say in defining the terms of the rights enforced against the institutions that
more directly reflect their will.19 Apart from the problem of justifying the limitation on the
aggregated preferences of affected citizens, there is the further question of why any one branch
should have interpretive primacy over the others, when the Constitution creates a generally
applicable mandate for all government action to be lawful. Executive and legislative actors are
therefore no less apt to run across questions demanding the exercise of legal judgment. While
the problem of the legitimacy of the power of unelected judges has been endlessly discussed,
under the rubric of the countermajoritarian difficulty, and there is a burgeoning literature on
executive branch constitutional interpretation,20 considerably less attention has been paid to how

19

See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
20
See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103
MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005); Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who
Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (2004); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
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the same jurisprudential puzzle arises when thinking about the ethics of lawyers acting as
advisors to government officials.21 Theories of political legitimacy, developed in the context of
constitutional law, may have analogues as applied to the rights and obligations of lawyers; there
may be important disanalogies, however, turning on differences in the nature of the relationship
between citizens and the law, on the one hand, and lawyers and the law on the other.

The aim of this paper is to hold on to the distinction between faithful interpretation of,
and advising on, the law, and improper politicization of the role of government lawyer, while
acknowledging that considerations of democratic legitimacy require that the President have
considerable discretion to establish a substantive, ideologically non-neutral policy agenda. There
is a middle ground here, in which government lawyers may be called upon to resist the
impermissible influence of politics and ideology, but not because there is an ideologically neutral
standpoint from which policies and actions can be evaluated. Rather, as lawyers, these
government officials can differentiate between permissible and impermissible exercises of state
power with respect to the content of the law. There is no claim here that the content of law is

Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers
and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in
a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 201 (1993); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992). By comparison,
less scholarly attention has been devoted to the issue of legislative constitutional interpretation is relatively. For an
important recent contribution to this area, see the essays collected in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds., 2006).
21
The relevant lawyers under consideration here are acting in an advisory capacity — rendering legal
opinions on the permissibility of government action, or even helping to design and execute government policy.
Lawyers acting as counselors are, in effect, law-givers with respect to an action, except in the event the action is
made the subject of a litigated dispute. By contrast, government lawyers in litigation contexts have more latitude to
urge creative or aggressive interpretations of law.
8

ideologically neutral; indeed, this is where the CLS critique has led us astray.22 Instead of
seeking a conception of legal legitimacy in which neutrality is central, we can rely on a thinner
conception, in which a necessary condition of legal legitimacy is the social source of legal norms
— the “pedigree” of law, as Dworkin calls it.23 This is still a liberal account, in that some
considerations are excluded as an acceptable justification for government decision-making. But
the exclusion does not work on standard law-politics lines. Some considerations may be
“political” in the sense that they form part of a larger ideological project, but are nevertheless
considerations that may properly count in favor of a legal judgment. In the endangered-species
example, a preference for intrinsic values related to the preservation of species may be part of an
ideological agenda, one associated in the United States with the environmental movement,
interest groups like the Sierra Club, Al Gore, etc. The law may nevertheless adopt or incorporate
these values, and their priority over economic considerations, through legislation and regulation
that establishes a side-constraint on government decision-making in favor of protecting
endangered species. Just as this law is not neutral between competing values, government
lawyers who work to circumvented should not be criticized for politicizing their role simply
because they are acting from a partisan, ideological agenda (one associated with Dick Cheney
and his preference for economic development over ecological preservation). Instead, the
criticism directed at these lawyers should be based on their failure to exhibit fidelity to the
existing law, and whatever values it happens to incorporate.

22

For claims that the law must be ideologically neutral in order to be legitimate, see, e.g., ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 66-67 (1975) (criticizing liberalism for being unable to solve the
problem of arbitrariness, in the sense that any legal restriction placed on the ability of one person to satisfy her
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The target of the arguments in this paper is not just CLS,24 but any theory of public ethics
that relies on a distinction between law and politics that is to be drawn with reference to the
content of the values in question, as opposed to the social sources of the norms. So, for example,
the basis for this account of government lawyers’ ethics will not be the classical Rechtstaat ideal
“that rulers [should] not direct the exercise of their authority towards private or partisan
objectives”25 It is permissible for state actors to direct their authority towards partisan
objectives, but only if those objectives have been embodied in laws permitting or requiring the
state to work toward those ends. Protecting endangered fish is no less a “partisan” objective than
providing water to farmers and ranchers. Fulmination about the politicization of some aspect of
the administration of law may be rhetorically appealing, but it strikes me as hopelessly naive
from a theoretical point of view. However, it is still possible to delineate a boundary between
permissible and impermissible grounds for government decision-making, by relying on a
distinction between law and non-law, with law defined as a legal positivist would, in terms of its
social sources.26 The law may embody contestable policy preferences, but that does not mean it

desires will necessarily benefit some individuals more than others).
23
See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 40 (1977).
24
I know it would be quixotic at best to revive an esoteric academic debate that arguably was on its last
legs in the late 1980's. The point here is not to reargue the CLS vs. everyone-else debate, but to show how the
critique of neutrality never really died out, and how it continues to influence the terms in which we evaluate
government officials. For one example among many of the contemporary salience of CLS ideas, consider some online debates about the Bush administration’s politicization of the Justice Department. Writing on the Balkinization
blog, Brian Tamanaha ironically noted that he now has some more sympathy for CLS, having seen how easily law
can become politics. One commentator then turned the CLS argument back on Tamanaha, noting that “[l]iberals
decry the Bush administration’s use of politics . . . because liberals have successfully defined the status quo as
somehow non-partisan.” See Brian Tamanaha, The Bush Administration Vindicates Critical Legal Studies,
<http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/05/bush-administration-vindicates-critical.html> (last visited 12/4/07).
25
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 272 (1980).
26
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-95, 100 (2d. ed. 1994) (defining the rule of recognition as
that norm which specifies binding criteria for legal officials to use in deciding whether a given norm is a rule that is
part of a legal system); Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 210, 211, 231
(1994) (identifying the law with certain sources, such as cases and statutes, whose content can be determined by
social facts alone, without resort to moral argumentation).
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is illegitimate. The source of its legitimacy is the process of its enactment, not its content. That
is to say, the fundamental commitment here is to a positivist conception of law, in which the
legitimacy of law can be traced to the social sources of legal norms. Accordingly, the foundation
of a theory of government lawyers’ ethics should be the obligation of fidelity to law enacted by
tolerably fair procedures, which supersedes the values (call them political, ideological, or
whatever) that would ordinarily constitute the ethics of some public role.27 The inside/outside
distinction, between considerations that may properly play a role in the decision-making of
government lawyers and those that may not, is given not by notions of neutrality and nonneutrality, but by being part of the material of law, or not. Admittedly, this is a thin conception
of the legitimacy of law, particularly as compared with republican, deliberative, or dialogic
notions of law-creation through participation or the contestation of legal meanings.28 As we will
see, however, I think there are good reasons to favor thinning out the grounds on which
agreement is necessary in order to secure legitimacy. As we will also see, some republican
elements will inevitably creep into the theory, under the guise of criteria for determining which
of several competing interpretations of the meaning of law is the best justified.

In defending the possibility of this middle-ground position, I will proceed by first arguing
against the several dominant theoretical paradigms for theorizing the ethics of government
lawyers. The first paradigm is public choice theory, which views the law merely instrumentally,
as a potential source of costs that must be balanced against the benefits of some course of action.
27

See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 42, 48, 58-61 (1986).
See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term —
28
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Section II.B will argue against the position that the interests, as opposed to the legal entitlements,
of clients ought to be centrally important in legal ethics. The second traditional theoretical
paradigm is that of government lawyers as servants of the public interest, which is related to the
modern revival of the civic republican tradition.29 As I will argue in Section II.C the persistence
of good-faith disagreement precludes the resort to a conception of the public interest, or some
notion of civic republican politics, as the foundation for the ethics of government lawyers.
Finally, Section II.D considers and rejects reliance on the notion of neutrality in liberal political
theory. The trouble with this approach is that neutrality in political philosophy is usually taken
to mean something like detachment from the positions of the competing sides in a debate or,
more colloquially, treating like cases alike.30 But as any lawyer knows, the respect in which
cases can be said to be alike or unlike is itself one of the contestable features of legal
interpretation.

This brings us to the constructive argument of Section III, which is an attempt to defend a
conception of government lawyers’ ethics which is based primarily on the obligation of fidelity
to positive law. Very roughly, that argument will reject the position that (1) the law is
sufficiently determinate on its own, so that any interpreter acting in good faith will be able to
discern a range of plausible meanings which can then be used as the basis of evaluating a

Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).
29
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
30
See Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and Moral Neutrality, in GOODIN & REEVE, supra note ___, 61, 63
(“The concept of neutrality presupposes a contest between two or more sides (two or more people, parties, teams,
nations, religions, ideals, values) and it focuses attention on a third or additional party whose actions and status are
in question and to whom either the term ‘neutral’ or the term ‘non-neutral’ is to be applied.”); RAZ, supra note ___,
at 113 (“To be neutral . . . is to do one’s best to help or to hinder the various parties concerned in an equal degree.”)
(quoting Alan Montefiore).
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proposed government action or policy, while also rejecting (2) the claim that the law itself may
be susceptible of such a wide range of plausible interpretations that the law is not a meaningful
restraint on government actions, but that determinacy can be provided from outside of law itself,
by relying on the judgment or character of the lawyers who apply it. The truth of the matter, I
think, is that something of both (1) and (2) are correct. That is, it seems to me that a theory of
legal interpretation must incorporates, tacitly or expressly, some aspects of a virtue-theoretic
approach. In earlier work I have defended an account of legal interpretation that emphasizes
acceptability to a professional community.31 Given the plurality of social sources of law,
including texts, principles, and interpretive conventions, the only way the law can have even a
moderately stable, recoverable meaning is if there were some extra-legal criteria for what
constitutes a plausible interpretation. These criteria are given by the norms of a professional
community, but these norms are not the sort of thing that are capable of being reduced to rules.32
There is an irreducible element of judgment, which is constrained by a professional community
in a non-algorithmic way. Although it is impossible to escape talk of judgment, I hope to use the
concept of professional judgment in a way that does not beg all the important questions, and does
not function as a black box in the theory. Criticizing government lawyers for failures of
professional judgment can be just a smokescreen for partisan disagreement, but if the notion of
judgment is fleshed out in the right way, it can do some useful analytical work despite
ideological differences. One practical upshot is that we may be able to improve the process of
decision-making by government lawyers by certain kinds of procedural reforms, emphasizing
31

See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1169 (2005).
At any rate, if they were rules, they would themselves stand in need of further interpretation, as Kripke’s
version of the rule-following argument shows. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE
32
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openness and checking by other institutions.33

A final methodological note: This paper is intended as an argument within philosophical
legal ethics. It is not intended as an analysis of the existing legal restrictions on partisan political
activities by government lawyers, such as the Hatch Act, or administrative agency regulations. It
may be that some of the actions described in the case studies below violate existing law. For
example, basing hiring decisions at the Justice Department on partisan political affiliation may
violate applicable DOJ regulations.34 Nor is the paper really about legal ethics as lawyers
sometimes understand that term, as equivalent to the state bar disciplinary rules. Government
lawyers are subject to discipline by the highest court of the state in which the attorney is
admitted to practice, as well as the state in which the lawyer’s activities occur.35 For the most
part, however, the disciplinary rules, based on the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
do not differentiate between private and government lawyers. More to the point, they do not
prescribe specific duties that are aimed at the recurring problem of partisanship in government
lawyering, understood as failure to apply the law faithfully. The target of the argument in this
paper is a more subtle kind of politicization, which may escape legal regulation but may
nevertheless be normatively undesirable. Finally, although there are aspects of these debates that
may bear on the “politicization” critique, this paper is not really about the theory of the unitary

LANGUAGE (1982).
33
See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive
Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2007); Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on
the Grammar of Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115 (Michael
W. Dowdle, ed., 2006).
34
See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 4.2.
35
See the so-called McDade Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a).
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executive,36 or the question of the identity of the client of a government lawyer, whether in a
specific agency (such as the Office of Legal Counsel or the Solicitor General’s office) or within
government generally.37 The case study in the following section should further clarify the nature
of the problem.

II.

The Inadequacy of Three Standard Approaches.

A.

Interpretive Controversies in the Executive Branch.

To illustrate and help draw contrasts among the three theoretical foundations of a
conception of government lawyers’ ethics, it will be helpful to refer, as an extended case study,
to one of the controversies arising from the Bush Administration’s claims of virtually unlimited
executive power. To summarize a complicated story, lawyers in the Justice Department’s Office
of Legal Counsel (OLC) had initially approved a program whereby the National Security Agency
(the government service responsible for electronic surveillance, spying, and wiretapping) would
be permitted to record telephone conversations without first obtaining a search warrant or court
36

See supra note ___.
Cf. REBECCA M . SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW (1992); Neal Devins,
Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV.
255 (1994); Douglas W. Kmiec, The OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993); Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WASH.
U. L.Q. 337 (1992); John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional
and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799 (1992); Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower:
Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291 (1991); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of
Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 951 (1991); Eric Schnapper, Becket at the Bar — The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1187 (1988); William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does a Government Lawyer Owe the
Duty of Loyalty When Clients are in Conflict?, 29 HOW. L.J. 539 (1986); Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the
Solicitor General — Representing the Interests of the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527
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order.38 The administration sought this permission despite the existence of a streamlined process
for obtaining permission to conduct electronic surveillance for national security purposes,
established by a statute called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).39
Administration lawyers considered two legal arguments to justify the President’s authority to
approve wiretaps without going through the FISA procedures. First, they argued that the
Authorization for Use of Military Force, passed by Congress soon after the September 11, 2001,
attacks, in effect superseded FISA for any intelligence-gathering activities that could help
prevent a terrorist attack.40 Second, some lawyers within the administration advanced a position

(1969).

38

For the background on the warrantless wiretapping program, FISA, and the executive-power
controversy, see Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power, WASH. POST (June 25,
2007), at A01; Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, “A Different Understanding With the President”, WASH. POST (June
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N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), at 1.
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Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq.
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The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001),
provides:
The President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order
to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.
The Justice Department’s arguments were summarized in a letter to the ranking majority and minority members of
the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, following disclosure of the warrantless wiretapping program by the
New York Times. The Justice Department also made available a longer “White Paper” containing more detailed
versions of the arguments. Both letters provoked responses from a group of legal scholars and former government
lawyers, who had served in both Democratic and Republican administrations. The principal criticism of the Justice
Department’s position can be found in a letter signed by numerous legal scholars and former government officials,
published in the New York Review of Books. See Curtis Bradley, et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y.
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with an introduction by David Cole and Marty Lederman. See David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National
Security Agency’s Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355 (2006). The commentary of
several legal scholars, including Marty Lederman, Jack Balkin, and Stephen Griffin, on the Balkinization blog were
invaluable in summarizing the many complex legal issues involved. These posts are archived at
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that, as a matter of constitutional law, the President has the inherent authority as Commander-inChief of the armed forces to authorize the collection of signals intelligence on enemy forces,
notwithstanding limitations imposed by FISA. The internal debate over the legality of the
program came to light in a dramatic fashion several years later, when former Deputy Attorney
General James Comey testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about the refusal of then
Attorney General John Ashcroft to certify the legality of the program when it came up for
reauthorization in March of 2004.41 Ashcroft had acted on the advice of Jack Goldsmith, who
had reviewed the program when he became the new head of the Office of Legal Counsel.42 Then
White House counsel (later Attorney General) Alberto Gonzales attempted to secure Ashcroft’s
approval of the program, while Ashcroft was recovering from surgery in a Washington
hospital.43 Debate about the government’s electronic surveillance program continued for several
years after the disclosure of the Ashcroft-Gonzales confrontation, with the Bush administration
insisting on retroactive immunity for telecommunications companies who had cooperated with
the government’s (illegal) spying efforts.44

While it is tempting to be cynical, and to dismiss the OLC lawyers who initially
authorized the surveillance as a bunch of partisan hacks, it is fairer (and, in fact, truer to the case)

41

The debate had been reported previously — see, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Justice Deputy
Resisted Parts of Spy Program, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2006) — but the story did not really take off until almost 18
months later, when Comey testified about the dramatic attempt at an “end run” around Ashcroft. See Sen. Patrick
Leahy, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing (May 15, 2007).
42
Goldsmith has stated that he is not permitted to discuss the legal basis for the administration’s so-called
Terrorist Surveillance Program. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 182 (2007).
43
Dan Eggen and Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST (May 16, 2007), at A01.
44
See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Ellen Nakashima, Spy Law Lapse Blamed for Lost Information, WASH. POST
(Feb. 23, 2008), at A03.
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to assume that these lawyers sincerely believed their view of the law to be sound, even if it had
not been generally accepted by courts. They certainly had a coherent, forcefully argued theory
of executive power, and were not troubled by taking a position outside the “mainstream,”
because they believed they are at the forefront of legal developments in this area.45 In their view,
the September 11th attacks should be regarded as a paradigm-shifting event, which courts will
eventually recognize as having fundamentally altered the normative landscape. In the meantime,
it is the job of lawyers to push for legal change, either in litigation or by taking creative positions
when counseling clients. To my contention that it cannot be the case that the professional
responsibility of lawyers is merely to provide a veneer of legality, these lawyers would respond
that their advice is not a sham, but is respectful of the law, as long as “the law” is not interpreted
in such a static way that it can never respond to pressure for change. Moreover, one must resist
the temptation to criticize their approach with reference to subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court which rejected many of the most sweeping claims made by the Vice President and his
allies.46 The plausibility of a legal judgment cannot be judged only in hindsight, but must be
evaluated to the extent possible from the ex ante point of view. The law can change
unexpectedly, and old verities suddenly swept away. Reasonable professional judgment is not
the same thing as clairvoyance.47 The relevant evaluative standpoint for the plausibility of a
45

For scholarly support of the strong executive power thesis in foreign affairs, see, e.g., John C. Yoo, War
and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002); John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False
Sirens of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002); Saikrishna B. Prakash Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive
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Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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had been ignoring. Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power, WASH. POST (June
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judgment is the state of the law at the time the lawyer provided the advice, with allowances made
for what a member of the professional community would regard as a reasonable argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

Because there is some superficial plausibility to the OLC lawyers’ position, it would
appear difficult to base an ethical critique of these lawyers on their failure to exhibit fidelity to
the law. In particular, these lawyers might respond that there are multiple potentially correct
interpretations of the governing law, and all they have done is rely on the interpretation that is
the most congenial to their client’s ends. What can be wrong with this? As I will discuss in
Section III, we need not withhold criticism, on the grounds of disrespect for the law, just because
there is a superficially plausible interpretation, as judged by the standards of an apparently
legitimate interpretive community. It is possible to deny the legitimacy of the interpretive norms
of certain communities, where those norms fail to track the conceptual requirements of legality.
However, recognizing the challenge of making this position stick, I will first review some
alternative grounds for criticizing or approving of the conduct of these lawyers. These three
positions, the subjects of Sections II.B, C, and D, respectively, are that (1) the principal ethical
obligation of any lawyers, for a public or private client, is to pursue the client’s lawful interests,
with the “lawful” qualification not imposing much in the way of limitation, because of the
indeterminacy of the law; (2) the ethical obligation of government lawyers is to act in the public
interest, and in particular to facilitate a process of dialogic engagement between the state and
citizens, over the content of the public interest; and (3) the ethics of government lawyers, like the

25, 2007), at A01 (quoting Timothy Flanigan).
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ethics of government officials generally, is primarily constituted by the requirement of neutrality
with respect to contested conceptions of the good. I will take up these positions in turn.

B.

Public Choice.

The position I am defending here requires lawyers to exhibit fidelity to the law when
advising their clients. Lawyers can thus be criticized for politicizing the advice they give to
clients if the advice deviates from what the law, impartially interpreted, would permit or require.
One who is inclined to reject this conception of ethical government lawyering might fall back on
the analytical tools of public choice theory, particularly the emphasis on the interests of various
players — government officials, pressure groups and lobbyists, the other branches of
government, and lawyers themselves. On the public choice account, the President competes with
the other branches of government, and other actors within the executive branch, over the scarce
good of determining government policy.48 A lawyer, as the faithful agent of her client, seeks to
advance her client’s interests through any lawful means. From this perspective, the
“politicization” critique is literally vacuous, because political actors should not be understood as
pursuing the public’s interests, or exhibiting fidelity to the law.49 Rather, executive branch

48
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executive branch lawyering, a “situational model,” in which “the President simply interprets the law to advance his
political objectives, taking into account precedent or legal principles only to the extent that they may create a
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officials, career bureaucrats, agency lawyers, and citizens should be understood as competing to
maximize their share of the scarce good of government policy. Although lawyers may have their
own interests, they are required, by contract and agency law, to serve as fiduciaries of their
clients. If the client has an agenda, it is the lawyer’s job to advance it, as long as the client’s
preferred course of action does not contravene applicable law. (Or, in a more extreme version,
as long as the client is unlikely to be caught and punished for engaging in a course of action.) In
the context of government lawyering, the “client” is generally understood to be an executive
branch agency, which may have its own agenda and policy differences vis-à-vis other
government actors.50 The lawyer’s duties therefore must be understood with reference to these
interests — a government lawyer, like any lawyer, may offer advice, but beyond that should not
interfere with the client’s liberty to take any lawful action.51

Sophisticated public choice theory can illuminate inter- and intra-branch conflicts, as well
as suggest ways that perverse incentives may affect decision-making by government officials and
their advisers.52 It cannot, however, do any normative work in a theory of government lawyers’
ethics if one believes there really is a distinction between impartial interpretation and execution
of the law as it exists, and simply getting away with something.53 In other words, the public
choice alternative is that it cannot account for the distinction between de facto power and
50
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legitimate authority. “Do X” may be the preference of a government official, but “It is legal to
do X” cannot be restated in public-choice terms in a way that captures the reason-giving force of
law. It is central to the concept of legality that it change the normative situation of citizens and
government officials.54 By contrast, public choice theory tacitly presupposes what might be
called the Holmesian bad man stance with respect to the law, after the notorious definition of law
proposed by Holmes.55 Holmes equated the content of law with predictions of how legal
officials would decide cases, and dramatized this definition by imagining a “bad man” who cared
only about avoiding the legal penalties that might be attached to his conduct. On this account,
the law does not impose limitations as such on citizens. Instead, knowledge of the law merely
enables people — at least lawyers, who are experts in ascertaining the content of the law — to
predict when the state will do something unpleasant, like lock people in jail or enforce a
monetary judgment. Legal penalties are to be counted as costs like any other, and weighed
against the benefits of some course of action.56 Further, it is an implication of Holmes’ position
that the only reason people have for action, namely maximizing the satisfaction of their
preferences, is antecedent to and independent of the law. This definition fits nicely with the
public choice story, because lawyers can then understand themselves as legitimately pursuing the
exogenous ends of their agency “clients,” advising their clients on the potential for legal
sanctions, but otherwise not standing in the way of their client agencies’ pursuit of their interests.
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Public choice theory can have no normative role to play in a theory of legal ethics
because the Holmesian bad man stance eliminates legality as a conceptual category altogether.
Consider a simple example of avoiding penalties: If a gangster bribes corrupt police officers and
judges, they will let him run a bookmaking operation, but that does not make the conduct legal.
It is no good to respond that the bribe is illegal, because if the gangster manages to bribe or
intimidate his way out of the bribery charges, then on the simple realist definition the original
bribery was not illegal. As David Luban notes, “[a] closed circle of corruption is, on [this
version of] the realist thesis, indistinguishable from the law.”57 Or, to make the example slightly
more relevant to the discussion at hand, if a government lawyer provides top-secret legal advice
that something is permissible, but refuses to disclose the reasoning supporting her argument, the
advice by itself does not make the conduct legal, even though the fact of a lawyer having said the
conduct is permissible makes punishment unlikely; whether the conduct is legal is a function of
the content of the legal reasoning provided by the lawyer, not merely the fact that a lawyer said
something is okay. In both of these cases, bribery, evasion, and other means of getting away
with conduct must be differentiated conceptually from legal compliance with reference to
something other than the likelihood of sanctions. Following H.L.A. Hart, my suggestion is that
the distinction between a legal right or permission, on the one hand, and getting away with
something, on the other, is a matter of regarding the law as intrinsically reason-giving — in
Hart’s terms, acknowledging legal obligations from the internal point of view.58 If a person is
concerned merely to act and to avoid sanctions, then she may adopt any attitude whatsoever
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toward the law, but she cannot claim to have acted lawfully without accepting the law as a reason
for action as such. Legality as an explanatory or justificatory concept simply drops out of the
picture unless one regards the law as intrinsically reason-giving.59 From a detached, external
point of view, someone may say, “Gee, look at that — I managed to avoid being thrown in jail,”
but from that perspective it is incoherent to say, “I acted lawfully.”

Hart was keenly concerned to avoid a definition of law that collapses legal obligation into
the threat of sanctions. He vigorously attacked the Austin-Bentham command-sanction
conception of law on many grounds, the most significant of which is that reducing all legal
commands to threats backed by force fails to account for the possibility of accepting norms from
the internal perspective. In addition to Holmesian bad citizens, who obey the law only out of
fear of punishment, there may also be “good” citizens, who believe that conduct rules are
weighty, or even conclusive of practical reasoning with respect to some matter, regardless of
how severe the remedy is which is attached to violation of the conduct rule.60 The good citizen
looks to the law for guidance, and regards legal directives as reasons for action, apart from any
consideration of whether he will be punished for failing to comply with the law. The good
citizen regards the law as a source of reasons, while the bad citizen’s reasons are essentially
unaltered by the law, except insofar as the law is another source of negative consequences like
being deprived of liberty or property. The bad citizen regards the law as a something like a force
59
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of nature, which can be studied and hopefully avoided, but which does not alter the citizen’s
practical reasoning by providing new reasons for action. The bad citizen is already concerned
with avoiding harm, and the law presents merely another kind of harm to be avoided. The
practical reasoning of the good citizen, by contrast, is altered in a different way by the law,
because she regards it as a reason for action that did not exist independently. From her internal
point of view, the good citizen accepts the law as creating new, justified demands.61

In Hart’s jurisprudence it is conceptually necessary only that judges regard a specific
legal norm — namely, the rule of recognition, which differentiates legal from non-legal
considerations — from the internal point of view. In his focus on the perspective judges must
take toward the law, Hart says relatively little about the perspective citizens must take. Perhaps
there can be a society in which there exist some good citizens and some bad ones, in the sense
we have been using “good” and “bad,” and the society can still be one that is law-governed, as
long as officials adopt the internal point of view when pronouncing on legal norms. It is clear,
on Hart’s account, that citizens may take the internal point of view, but he does not argue that
they must. Indeed, he admits that “private citizens . . . may obey each ‘for his part only’ and
ed. 1994).

61
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from any motive whatever.”62 A society in which only judges accepted the law from the internal
point of view might be “deplorably sheeplike,”63 but there is no reason why a society composed
predominantly of bad citizens or passive, sheeplike subjects could not be said to have a legal
system, as long as judges viewed the law from the internal perspective. Hart’s only explicit
argument regarding citizens’ attitudes in The Concept of Law is that command-sanction theories
of law, as well as American legal realism (represented by Holmes, among others), are
theoretically deficient in that they lack the conceptual resources to account for the possibility of
citizens taking the internal point of view.64 It may be the case, however, that Hart stopped short
of where his theory logically would end up, and that there are good reasons to require citizens to
regard the law from the internal point of view, at least insofar as they seek to act lawfully. That
reason is, roughly, that it would be incoherent to claim to act legitimately when one exploits the
legal system, by “simultaneously living within its shelter and breaking its restrictions.”65

Modestly extending Hart’s position, I believe that the perspective of the good citizen is
constitutive of genuine legal compliance. The argument trades on what is necessarily involved
in claiming that one is acting lawfully. Anyone who claims to care about having her actions
described as lawful, as opposed to “something I got away with,” is thereby committed to viewing
the law as creating reasons for actions as such. The linchpin of this expressivist argument is
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therefore the purpose for which a citizen engages with the law. She may be interested only in
describing and predicting certain patterns of behavior among fellow citizens, in which case it is
perfectly appropriate to take an external perspective on the law. If she is interested in acting
lawfully, however, her practical reasoning necessarily proceeds from the internal perspective.
The internal perspective is mandated by the conjunction of action, as opposed to observation (for
which an external perspective would be adequate) and the evaluation that an action is lawful, as
opposed to merely something that one can get away with. If this relationship holds, then acting
under law while regarding the law from an external point of view would be on a par, normatively
speaking, with robbing a bank and successfully asserting an alibi defense, or bribing a prosecutor
to drop charges. The actor would have managed to avoid sanctions, but the evaluation of the
action would be that it was wrong from the standpoint of a relevant normative framework, that of
legality.

The appeal to the discourse of legality is natural when one wishes to assert not only that
one wants something, or has the power to obtain it, but that it is right that one have it. For
something to be a legal right, it must be an aspect of a legal system, which is necessarily
connected with the interests and values of a society, not the individual.66 Legality is the
normative domain in which citizens seek to transform brute demands into assertions of rights.67
This transformation necessarily commits one to a certain pattern of explanation and justification.
66
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This is the case for participants in any practice, whether players in a game, initiates of a religious
vocation, political officials or, in this case, citizens who seek the ascription of lawfulness for
their actions.68 Participating in social practices entails accepting the authority of internal,
practice-dependent regulative standards as guides to behavior, and accepting the legitimacy of
criticism based on those standards. These regulative standards are not arbitrary, but have their
origin in some ultimate state of affairs or value that is the aim of the social practice of which they
a part.69 The regulative standards of the practice has authority for a participant because of the
participant’s voluntary act of “opting in” to the practice.70 It would be a conceptual error for
participants to regard the norms of a practice from an external point of view, because to
participate in a practice means to aim at the end for which the practice is constituted, and doing
this requires conformity to the internal regulative standards of the practice. Thus, the “bad man”
perspective on any practice is ruled out by the act of avowing that one is a participant, rather than
an observer.71

Applying all of this to public choice theory, it should be apparent that it is insufficient,
from a normative point of view, to assert that the duty of a government lawyer is to maximize the
likelihood that her “clients” — a particular agency, for example — will prevail in some struggle
for control over the policy-making agenda. Descriptively, it may be the case that “Congress, the
68

I use the term “practice” here in the sense, developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, of “any coherent and
complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of
activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity.” ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 176 (2d ed. 1984).
69
See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). In the Postscript to the second edition
of The Concept of Law, Hart explains the internal/external distinction with reference to the practice conception of
rules. See HART, supra note ___, at 254-55.
70
MACINTYRE, supra note ___, at 190.

28

federal courts, and other agencies can and should protect their own interests.”72 This does not
mean, however, that ascertaining the interests of one’s political superiors exhaust the practical
reasoning of government lawyers, if lawyers are concerned to attribute a special legal
significance to their advice. It may be that lawyers care only about keeping their political
superiors out of trouble, in which case the expressivist argument set out here would not have
much bite. It may also be the case that political superiors are concerned to obtain simply a
lawyer’s approval, not a lawyer’s evaluation that such-and-such is lawful. (David Luban has
argued that, with respect to legal advising on the treatment of detainees and permissible
interrogation techniques, the Bush Administration desired, and Justice Department lawyers
provided, only the pretense of legal advice, in order to provide political cover for doing
something that the administration was committed to doing anyway.73) To the extent a lawyer’s
legal advice is intended in good faith, however, it is simply incoherent to render it without regard
to the actual content of the law, as opposed to the likelihood of punishment, the interests of the
various parties, and other considerations that may be weighed as costs and benefits.

With respect to the “politicization” critique, it would be a mistake to rely on public
choice theory to argue that there is really no such thing as politicized legal advice. An
oversimplified public-choice approach to government lawyers’ ethics might be to instruct
lawyers simply to pursue the interests of their agency clients — to be “zealous advocates” of
these positions when there is some conflict with other branches of government or political
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opponents outside of government. This conception of the duty of government lawyers will not
do, because it omits the concept of lawfulness entirely. As lawyers (in both private and
government practice) sometimes forget, the little mantra describing their duties is actually
“zealous representation within the bounds of the law.”74 That means that the interests of clients
— political or otherwise — are not only consideration to be taken into account. Instead, the
lawyer’s job is to pursue the interests of the client, but only to the extent it is legally permissible
to do so. I do not believe legal permissibility is a matter of making simple, binary judgments that
the law either does or does not permit something. The law does not work like that, and there
may be a range of reasonable, good faith disagreement over what is legally permitted. The
underdetermination of legal judgments by existing legal materials (texts, immanent principles,
interpretive methodologies, and so on) creates the possibility that a lawyer’s advice may be
deemed mainstream or “creative” by degrees. There is usually a confidence dimension attached
to legal advice, so that lawyers’ judgments come in the form of a two-place variable. Lawyers
are accustomed to thinking in this way, even if they do not always communicate their doubts to
clients, so that the conclusion of legal research and analysis might be, “I’m pretty sure you can
do that,” or “You can give it a shot, but I expect it won’t work.” More formally, an interpretive
judgment would consist of “N = (x, y)” where “N” is the conduct the client wishes to engage in,
“x” is the lawyer’s judgment about a substantive entitlement, and “y” is the confidence
dimension.
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The politicization critique can therefore be restated in terms of (1) how much confidence
a lawyer must have in an interpretive judgment before advising a client that it can do what it
wants to do, and (2) how much “creativity” we are willing to tolerate in legal interpretation
before we conclude that a lawyer is not interpreting the law in good faith, but is instead
providing “plausible deniability” or a veneer of legality to cover a lawless act by the client. In
the context of government lawyering, particularly the opinion function of the Attorney General
and the Office of Legal Counsel, there is a well known debate over whether lawyers should be
“neutral expositors” of the law, offering the best view of what the law actually is, reasoning from
a quasi-judicial point of view, or whether lawyers are permitted to push the envelope, and rely on
interpretations that are defensible, but farther from the core of the best available interpretation of
the law.75 To put it another way, must executive branch lawyers faithfully follow existing court
decisions, or is their independent opinion function less constrained than a judge’s discretion in a
comparable case? No one really questions the principle that executive branch officials must
independently make judgments about the legal permissibility of some course of action; the
separation of powers doctrine vests each branch with a substantial measure of autonomy,
including the responsibility to evaluate the legal basis for their activities. The question, instead,
is whether an executive branch official may act on the basis of a judgment that diverges from
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what the judiciary would decide, if it considered the case.

At this point in the argument, critics of the “neutral expositor” model engage in a subtle
sleight of hand. John McGinnis’s formulation is typical:
The strongest argument for executive independence with respect to the analytical
judgments of the Court rests on the notion that even these judgments need to be
subject to challenge by another institution with a different perspective. The
distinctive institutional perspective of the executive branch, however, rests
precisely on the fact that it is closer to the popular will.76
The italicized word, “different,” slyly suggests that the executive and judicial branches may
simply have a disagreement about the right way to interpret the law, and that is all that can be
said about the matter — you say tom-ay-to, I say tom-ah-to. If the disagreement were just a
matter of taste or preference, then McGinnis would be correct to favor the interpretation of the
branch with a closer connection to the will of the people. But notice how we are supposed to take
for granted that all disagreements over legal interpretations come down to questions of taste.

Here again we encounter the tacit reliance on a CLS position — this time, the claim that
objectivity in legal interpretation is illusory.77 It is now fairly well recognized, however, that this
particular CLS argument proceeded by holding up as the ideal an implausibly strong conception
of objectivity, in which objective judgments are exemplified by findings of the natural sciences.
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But objectivity in law need be only moderately domain-specific, meaning that the characteristics
of as an objective judgment in the natural sciences will differ in some respects from that which
makes a judgment objective in art criticism, basketball officiating, or faculty hiring decisions.78
An objective judgment in any endeavor must have certain characteristics: (1) independence from
the subjectivity of the judging subject, openness to the subject matter, and willingness to base
judgments on the subject itself, not personal idiosyncracies; (2) amenability to evaluation of the
correctness of judgments, or standards for assessing judgments; and (3) invariance across
judging subjects.79 I have argued elsewhere that a community of lawyers and judges, relying on
largely tacit rules regulating interpretation, can reach a substantial degree of intersubjective
agreement on what counts as a plausible legal judgment.80 Without getting into the particulars of
that argument, it is noteworthy that McGinnis’s argument implicitly denies that lawyers in the
executive branch and judges can reach intersubjective agreement on the correctness of legal
judgments, so that disagreements over interpretation is simply a matter of preference, as opposed
to one of the interpreters having gotten it wrong. If McGinnis is correct about this, then there
really is nothing left of the “politicization” critique.

While I believe this is too strong, and there is a moderate degree of objectivity in legal
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interpretation, the real bite of the public choice critique comes in cases in which reasonable
minds can differ over the correct interpretation — not because there is no such thing as
objectivity, but because there is genuine (i.e. objective) uncertainty over the best way to interpret
existing law. Lawyers commonly give advice of the form, “I’m pretty sure you can do that, but
there’s a risk that a court won’t go along,” or, “While I think it’s a bit of a stretch to argue that
the AUMF supersedes the warrant requirement in FISA, it’s not a ridiculous argument, so if
you’re willing to accept the risk of losing in court, you can go for it.” No one disputes that if a
court has rendered a binding judgment, executive branch officials are duty-bound to respect it.
There is nevertheless uncertainty over the binding effect of legal principles that have been
invoked in support of past judicial decisions.81 In essence, the “neutral expositor” view instructs
executive branch lawyers to consider those principles and other underlying reasons, and render
the same decision as an ideal judge, who is concerned to come up with the best interpretation of
the law — to show the law in its best light, as Ronald Dworkin puts it.82 Superficially, at least,
this seems odd. Lawyers and judges occupy discrete roles in the legal system, and should be
expected to have different responsibilities. The adversary system — to say nothing of the
separation of powers doctrine — enacts a normative division of labor among various institutional
actors, responding to political needs such as limiting government power and enhancing
accountability. Lawyers for private clients, at least in litigation, need not assert only legal
positions they believe to be the best view of the law, or even reasonably well founded. As long
as a legal argument is not lacking in any foundation whatsoever, it is permissible to urge it to a
court.
81
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I have never understood why this argument from the adversary system is thought to prove
anything about legal advising outside the litigation context. The argument proceeds by taking
the lawyer’s litigation-advocacy role as the baseline, and then demanding a justification for any
deviation from that baseline. Regarding executive branch lawyers, the arguments that have been
offered, from history, the text of the Constitutional (particularly the Take Care Clause and the
presidential oath of office), and constitutional structure, are inconclusive.83 Thus, goes the
appeal to the adversary system, we do not have a sufficient reason to deviate from the baseline
conception of the lawyer’s role. But why should we take the lawyer’s litigation-related duties
and permissions as the baseline, and not as a special case? In my view, the obligations of
lawyers, as agents of clients, have to be understood with reference to the client’s legal
entitlements. In any principal-agent relationship, including the attorney-client relationship, the
agent’s rights and obligations are derivative of those of the principal. Someone who retains a
broker to sell property empowers the broker to transfer only whatever title the owner has.
Similarly, a lawyer’s professional role is defined with reference to the rights and duties vested in
the client by the law. This principle pervades the law governing lawyers, including specific rules
of tort, agency, and constitutional law as they apply to lawyers. For example, as the agent of the
client, the lawyer retains inherent authority, which cannot be overridden by agreement with the
client, to refuse to perform unlawful acts.84 Regarding the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the
effective assistance of counsel to criminal defendants, the Supreme Court has held that a criminal
82
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defendant cannot complain if his lawyer refuses to permit him to perjure himself at trial, because
a lawyer’s duty is “limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial
as a search for truth.”85 As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurring opinion, the client had no
legitimate interest that conflicted with his lawyer’s obligation not to present perjured
testimony.86 Similarly, the Court in Strickland v. Washington said that lawyers are not obligated
to exploit “arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification,’ and the like.”87 There are numerous,
less dramatic cases underscoring the same point. In one legal malpractice case based on the
lawyer’s failure to use reasonable care in evaluating a settlement offer, the court of appeals
affirmed dismissal of the claim against the lawyer because the client’s underlying claim was
barred by the statute of limitations.88 Because the client’s legal entitlement was time barred, any
recovery or settlement the client had obtained from the defendant in the underlying personalinjury action was purely a windfall. The lawyers’ negligence in representing the plaintiff in the
personal-injury lawsuit did not deprive her of anything to which she was legally entitled, so she
could not sue them for malpractice.

Litigation is a special case because lawyers are permitted to assert the arguable legal
entitlements of clients, leaving it up to the workings of the adversary system to evaluate whether
the lawyer’s position is plausible. Even in the litigation context, however, the rights and
permissions of lawyers are ultimately grounded on their clients’ legal entitlements. Lawyers
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may not assert constructions of law that are not adequately grounded, either in existing law or in
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.89 Lawyers
have an obligation to disclose controlling legal authority not cited by their adversary, an
obligation that does not extend to factual evidence not discovered by opposing counsel.90
Advocates have been severely sanctions for stretching legal arguments too far, and not candidly
informing the court of the limitations of their position.91 Even in litigation, fidelity to law is one
of the fundamental obligations of the lawyer, along with loyalty to the client. The difference
between the litigation and counseling contexts is that, in litigation, lawyers share responsibility
with other institutional actors for ensuring that the law is not distorted or misapplied. In the
counseling context, there is no institutional mechanism, comparable to adversary briefing, oral
argument, and appeal, to ensure that the lawyer’s proposed interpretation of law is the correct
one. Thus, lawyers have what feels like a heightened obligation of fidelity to law, but in reality
the obligation is the same ---- it is just not shared with coordinate institutional actors.

To turn the burden-of-proof argument around, one who contends that a government
lawyer need provide only a colorable legal basis for a proposed course of action has the burden
to explain why a lawyer, seeking to ascertain whether a client has a legal entitlement to do
something, should be content to get the answer only approximately right, or should aim for the
best answer. Consider a comparable professional principal-agent relationship, such as a patient
seeking medical advice. Suppose the doctor could provide a colorable diagnosis or the best

89
90
91

FED. R. CIV. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 3.1.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Rule 3.3(a)(2).
See, e.g., Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

37

diagnosis, with roughly the same investment of time and effort. It is hard to imagine a patient
who would be content with anything less than the best diagnosis the doctor was able to provide.
In the legal counseling context, the reason clients seek merely colorable advice is that they are
interested in getting away with something that is not a genuine legal right. In the FISA example,
if it would be a real stretch to believe that the AUMF supersedes the FISA warrant requirement,
and the better view of the governing is that it does not, the lawyer would be offering two
alternatives — what the client’s right probably is, and what the client’s right likely is not.
Granting that the administration’s interest in this case is to avoid the warrant requirement, I do
not see how that interest changes the normative situation of the lawyer, whose role is defined by
the obligation to ascertain and apply the client’s legal entitlements. Deliberately relying on the
less plausible interpretation of the applicable law is nothing but an evasion of the basic
responsibility of a lawyer. Again, if a matter is in litigation, we permit lawyers to urge less
plausible interpretations of law, because we think the adversary system needs some input of
interpretive creativity if it is to remain sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances.
In the counseling context, however, a lawyer’s job is to find the limits of the client’s legal
entitlements, because the client is only permitted to act with legal authorization.92

In summary, the shortcoming of the public-choice approach to lawyers’ ethics is that it
denies that lawyers can have any genuine obligation of fidelity to law. The public choice theorist
asserts that we may talk in normative terms, using the language of duties and “oughts,” but all of
these would-be obligations are really just roundabout ways of saying that there would be
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negative political repercussions to appearing to act lawlessly. If it is possible to act lawlessly
and get away with it, lawyers have no duty to advise their client against that course of action and,
indeed, if it is in the client’s interests, the lawyer may have a duty to assist the client. On the
level of ordinary-language analysis, one might ask the public-choice theorist why she bothers
using words like “lawful” and “right” when what she really means is “what my client can get
away with.” A more natural interpretation of that language is that lawyers and government
officials really do mean to avow, when they use the language of obligation and right, that they
are acting with reference to some normative considerations that are independent of their interests.
Picking up on an observation of Hart’s, public choice theory lacks the conceptual resources to
account for the evident fact that citizens, government officials, and lawyers explain and justify
their actions with reference to genuine obligations, not merely interests.93

C.

Civic Republicanism and the Public Interest.

A very different fallback position, which would allow one to criticize government
lawyers for politicized decision-making, is to appeal to a notion of the public interest. This
position is a staple of the self-justifying rhetoric of government lawyers — present or former
Attorneys General, or nominees for the office. As President Carter’s Attorney General, Griffin
Bell, stated in a lecture at Fordham Law School, “Although our client is the government, in the
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end we serve a more important constituency: the American people.”94 Courts similarly state that
government lawyers have an obligation to see to it that justice is done, not simply to maximize
the likelihood that the client’s interests will be achieved.95 However, this is not just empty
rhetoric for graduation speeches. It has been offered in this form as a sophisticated alternative to
the view, dominant among practicing lawyers, that the lawyer’s role is primarily to be
understood with reference to client interests, with the law understood as nothing more than an
obstacle standing in the way of their clients’ ends.96 In addition, there is a long tradition in
political philosophy, associated with the ideal of the rule of law, of understanding the principal
obligation of government officials as acting in the public interest.97

Significantly, the public interest is not understood in rational-choice terms, as the
aggregation of preferences through some procedure of majoritarian decision-making. In civic
republican theory, the public interest is expressly contrasted with the will of (perhaps transient)
political majorities. Frank Michelman, for example, criticizes the Supreme Court’s Bowers v.
Hardwick decision for its assumption that “public values meriting enforcement as law are to be
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uncritically equated with . . . the formally enacted preferences of a recent legislative or past
constitutional majority.”98 Because it is now accepted wisdom that executive branch officials,
not just the courts, have a role in enforcing the law, the implication of Michelman’s critique is
that government lawyers, as well as judges, should not concern themselves only with “the
formally enacted preferences of a recent legislative . . . majority.” As law constantly re-creates
itself in line with the public reasons of citizens, its precise contours remain uncertain, subject to
contestation in the dialectic process of politics. In other words, Michelman would instruct
government lawyers not to be legal positivists, and not to enforce only those public values that
have an appropriate democratic pedigree.

The natural response to this anti-positivist move is to point out that government decisions
are supposed to be traceable back to some manifestation of the popular will. When lawyers act
on what they take to be the public interest, the usurp power that should belong to the people as a
whole.99 We wouldn’t bother having elections if it were clear what the public interest requires,
not only for the epistemological reason that elections provide information on the preferences of
citizens, but also for the deeply moral reason that de facto power is insufficient to justify the
claim by the state to possess authority.100 Michelman, however, calls this answer “both lazy and
presumptuous.”101 Political freedom means both collective self-rule and government by laws.102

98

Michelman, supra note ___, at 1496.
See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
100
See Bernard Williams, Realism and Moralism in Political Theory, in IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED
1, 5 (Geoffrey Hawthorn, ed., 2005) (defining the Basic Legitimation Demand as a constitutive element of “there
being such a thing as politics”).
101
Michelman, supra note ___, at 1498.
102
Id. at 1500-01.
99

41

These two conceptions of freedom can be best reconciled by understanding the legitimacy of the
product of a political process in terms of shared, collective participation, not merely the
aggregation of antecedent preferences. In Robert Cover’s term, politics must be jurisgenerative
— i.e. capable of transforming private persons into public-regarding citizens.103 The political
process must be structured in such a way that it does not simply feed in exogenous preferences as
inputs, and produce laws as outputs, according to some aggregation process. Instead, the
political process must permit citizens to persuade each other, to alter their pre-existing
preferences, and to work together as a community, in the name of the interests of the society as a
whole. Citizens must act non-strategically, be open to persuasion, and be committed to acting
from a kind of idealized first-person-plural point of view, as opposed to trying to maximize the
satisfaction of their preferences.

I tend to regard this whole line of thought as far-fetched, not because it is not appealing to
imagine the kind of community it presupposes, but because it is ill-suited to serve as a regulative
ideal for a large-scale, decentralized, complex, pluralistic society. There are at least three
reasons for this. The first pertains to the motivation to participate in jurisgenerative politics: A
sizeable number of would-be citizens are in fact concerned only to maximize the satisfaction of
their preferences, and regard politics as a zero-sum game. If it is a necessary condition of
political legitimacy that people are open to persuasion, a broad swath of law would have to be
regarded as illegitimate. The second is that most people simply are not committed to any point
of view with regard to the technical details of government policy, but the function of politics and
103
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law is frequently to settle on those pesky technical details. This is particularly true where there is
agreement at a high level of generality but, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details. Even
assuming a general consensus that, for example, taxation should be generally (but not too
steeply) progressive, there will still be a great deal of disagreement at the level of application,
such as how mortgage interest and retirement savings should be treated for tax purposes. A
related objection is that the technical details in question may pertain to the procedures used to
handle debate and settle on the position that will be adopted in the name of the society.104 It
seems unlikely that deliberation will yield real consensus on important matters (a point
elaborated below), so we need some way to reach at least provisional agreement — “an uneasy
compromise, subject to constant renegotiation,”105 which is at least final enough to enable
coordinated action for the time being. If deliberative engagement does not produce consensus,
some procedure will have to be adopted to resolve the disagreement, but if consensus is required
on how these procedures are to be structured, then the result may be an infinite regress of
unsettled disagreement. Third, and of the greatest theoretical interest, politics may inevitably
involve compromises, and have a zero-sum nature, because many of the issues at stake in politics
are not susceptible to rational resolution. This is due to moral pluralism and the
incommensurability of conceptions of the good.

Moral pluralism is the claim that human experience, and the goods and values associated
with it, is sufficiently complex that it is impossible to reduce all of these goods and values to
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some higher-order master value that can be used to rank and prioritize competing ethical
considerations.106 Competing values may be formally different, in that some pertain to things we
have reason to care about from an impersonal perspective (i.e. consequences), while others
depend on seeing ourselves as in some way the source of value (agent-relative reasons, such as
deontological considerations).107 These micro-level value conflicts may conflicts within a single
conception of the good life or they may represent conflicts between rival visions of human
flourishing. As Isaiah Berlin argued, there are many different ends people may pursue, and still
be recognized as fully rational, and fully human; there are multiple objectively valuable things
that individuals and cultures may regard as fulfilling and worthy objects of attainment.108 The
attainment of one of these ideals often requires the subordination or abandonment of others.109
There is no possibility of a life which embodies certain goods or virtues without excluding
others.
[W]e are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally
absolute, the realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of
others. . . . [I]t seems to me that the belief that some single formula can in
principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously
realised is demonstrably false. If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not
all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of
conflict — and of tragedy — can never be wholly eliminated from human life,
either personal or social.110
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These “diverse ends of man” are incommensurable in that there is no way that one can
rationally judge one way of life to be better than another, or of equal value. For Berlin the
primary significance of this observation was political. One of the central themes in his work is
that human history teaches us to be extremely wary of any claim to political legitimacy and
authority that is founded upon a claim that the rulers have accurately discerned the “true” nature
of their subjects.111 “In the ideal case, liberty coincides with law[;] autonomy with authority,”112
but this is true only if human beings have only one true purpose, and “the ends of all rational
beings must of necessity fit into a single universal, harmonious pattern.”113 Berlin’s striking
observation is that the worst tyrannies and the most utopian hopes for human salvation through
government shared the Platonic belief that there is only one rationally appointed order for human
life.114

It would be a dramatic overstatement to say that directing government officials, and
government lawyers, to act directly on their perception of the public interest would lead to
tyranny. However, it may nevertheless be the case that government decisions based on an
official’s beliefs — even sincere, good faith beliefs — about morality are lacking in legitimacy.
This is a position that is, somewhat surprisingly, considered radical or dangerous in political
110
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philosophy. It is certainly at odds with the classical conception of the rule of law, in which the
function of the law is seen as “holding . . . the rulers to their side of a relationship of reciprocity,
in which the claims of authority are respected on condition that authority respects the claims of
the common good.”115 This way of looking at the rule of law depends on a distinction between
the common good and private or partisan interests. But how should this distinction be drawn in
specific cases? Here we encounter the problem of normative pluralism and good faith
disagreement. Suppose it is self-evidently true that the common good consists of the following
things:
CG1 = education
CG2 = health
CG3 = clean air and water
CG4 = physical security
CG5 = equality
Now we would have to determine whether a state authority is “respecting the common good”
when it decides that CG1 would be best promoted by permitting states to give vouchers to parents
who wished to send their children to religious schools; whether CG2 would be best promoted by
vetoing legislation designed to broaden government funding of health care for poor children;
whether CG3 would be best promoted by permitting coal-fired power plants to make
modifications without complying with more stringent environmental laws applicable to newly
constructed plants; whether CG4 would be best promoted by criminalizing minor drug possession
(on a “broken windows” theory, perhaps); whether CG5 would best be promoted by opposing
affirmative action in higher education; and so on.
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One might respond that deliberative or jurisgenerative politics can exist despite moral
pluralism. Michelman himself takes that tack, arguing that it is impossible to understand even a
fairly thin conception of democratic legitimacy without positing the “mutual and reciprocal
awareness [of citizens] of being co-participants not just in this one debate, but in a more
encompassing common life . . ..”116 But he seems to slide a bit too easily from the possibility of
participation in a shared experience — “the possibility of cases in which [legal] validation occurs
when participants, rather than abandoning their commitments, come to hold the same
commitments in a new way”117 — to a necessary condition of legal validity. A great many laws
would appear to fail this test for validity, since many do not arise as the result of any public
debate at all, and among those that do, many result from compromises between positions that
remain unaltered. In fairness to Michelman, he is talking about constitutional law, not ordinary
laws of less moment, but the tenor of much writing on civic republicanism tends to valorize
participatory politics and the possibility of the transformation of pre-legal preferences through
engagement with one’s fellow citizens.118 What Michelman objects most strongly to is legal
positivism, i.e. “the view that judicial power cannot be legitimate unless its exercise consists, in
the final analysis, of the translation of directions uttered in the past by someone else.”119 If there
is anything that unites the disparate varieties of legal positivism it is the commitment to this
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position, which Joseph Raz refers to as the Sources Thesis.120 To be a positivist is to accept that
the content and validity of any law is fundamentally a matter of social fact, and the relevant
social facts are generally the past utterances of institutional actors such as legislators and judges.
If this is the case, then it is an empirical matter to discover the content of the law — one simply
looks at the relevant sources to determine what judges have relied upon as reasons for their
decisions. Metaphorically, one can draw a boundary line separating reasons that are “inside” the
law from those that are “outside” the law. Armed with this information, one can then criticize, as
failing to respect the obligation of impartiality, government lawyers who make reference to
reasons outside the law when justifying a would-be legal interpretation. On the other hand, if
some kind of moral or political argument is required to differentiate between law and non-law, it
is not simply an empirical matter to draw a boundary separating inside from outside. The
distinction between law and non-law would be evaluative and contestable, and would make
reference to the very sorts of political, ideological, and policy reasons that may or may not be
part of the law.

The claim that the possibility of a value-free, or apolitical distinction between law and
non-law is untenable is also at the heart of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law. Dworkin argues
that “judicial decisions in civil cases . . . characteristically are and should be generated by
principle not policy.”121 For Dworkin, the distinction between reasons of principle and reasons
of policy is that principles can be shown to be consistent with past political decisions made by
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other officials (judges and legislators) within a general political theory that justifies those
decisions.122 Policy reasons, in contrast with principles, may refer to moral norms but these are
not norms that belong to this particular society’s political morality.123 Reasons of principle are
therefore “inside” a particular society’s law and reasons of policy are “outside” the law of that
community, but note that for Dworkin, “the law” must be understood in an idiosyncratic way.
Hart claims that for any legal system, there is a master rule for distinguishing law from non-law;
this is the rule of recognition.124 He further insists that the existence and content of the law can
be determined without reference to moral criteria.125 Dworkin challenges both the existence of a
rule of recognition and the content-independence of law. He denies that a rule of recognition can
ever be formulated because moral argumentation is necessary to establish the existence of legal
principles.126 Reasons of principle are controversial in the sense that they cannot simply be “read
off” the law in a straightforward way, without arguing that they are justified on the basis of the
normative political theory.127 There can be no source-based criteria for identifying legal
principles. Reasons given by judges in precedent cases must be understood as arguments of
political theory about what the law should be.128 The practice of making and justifying legal
judgments is therefore normative all the way down.
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Dworkin’s position is a challenge to Hart’s view that the authority of law is a function of
a convention among judges of making reference to certain considerations when deciding
cases.129 It amounts to a denial of the view that “social facts are what make rule-of-recognition
statements true, and therefore social facts are what make it the case that the law is one way rather
than another.”130 Thus, determining the inside/outside boundary, and defining fidelity to law in
terms of relevant and excluded considerations, are not empirical matters; instead they involve
direct engagement by an interpreter (whether a judge or a lawyer) in contestable normative
matters. Further, according to Dworkin, we must believe in the existence of legal principles in
order to account for what a judge is doing when he or she decides a case in which existing law
does not unambiguously determine the result. In Dworkin’s view, a judge should never step
outside existing law and make new law, for to do so would be to retroactively confer new rights
on the parties.131 But he is able to insist on this stipulation only because “existing law” includes
a great deal of political morality, in the form of legal principles.

The question is, therefore, why one should be a positivist and not subscribe to
Michelman’s view that legal interpretation is not a matter of uncovering what has happened in
the past, but is a dynamic process of creating one’s normative universe, or Dworkin’s view that
the law consists in part of principles, which embody the community’s political morality. For if
Michelman and Dworkin are right, there is a strong case that lawyers in government service out
to contribute to the process of jurisgenesis by urging political officials to act on a conception of
129
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the public interest, even if it is presently contested. A theory of lawyers’ ethics is therefore
connected to a theory of law by the question of what sorts of considerations “count” as law, and
therefore should be taken into account by lawyers advising their clients on the legality of a
proposed course of action. Michelman and Dworkin resist the separation of law and politics by
arguing for a conception of law, and a conception of politics, in which law and politics are two
sides of the same coin. In response, some legal positivists may rely on conceptual arguments,
like Raz’s well known argument from authority.132 Alternatively, positivists may offer
normative (or maybe better described as functional) arguments, relying on the point of having
law in the first place.133 Something like the Hart-Dworkin debate cannot be settled solely by
conceptual analysis; progress depends, instead, on having some idea of why we care about
questions like whether there are legal principles, and how they are different from legal rules and
extra-legal “policy” considerations. Michelman appeals to history and political theory, Dworkin
to common usage among lawyers and judges. My reliance here on moral pluralism is intended to
underwrite a functional claim that the point of having law is to enable citizens to coexist and
cooperate on mutually beneficial projects despite persistent disagreement.

Law is “ an importantly distinct mode or aspect of governance”134 precisely because of its
independence from contested conceptions of the public good. It provides a framework for
coordinated action in the face of dissensus, perhaps at the expense (as Michelman suggests, with
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his reference to the legitimacy of Brown v. Board of Education) of respect for marginalized
groups and the capacity to keep pace with social change.135
The claim of the normative positivist is that the values associated with law,
legality, and the rule of law — in a fairly rich sense — can best be achieved if the
ordinary operation of such a system does not require people to exercise moral
judgment in order to find out what the law is.136
The value of legality within government can best be achieved by directing government lawyers
not to act directly on what they perceive to be the public good, because what the public good
requires is contested, in good faith, in most interesting cases. Government through law means,
however, that we must eventually move beyond this disagreement and do something about a
problem. The law provides a framework for dealing, cooperatively, with these problems by
enacting a provisional settlement of normative disagreement. It is therefore incumbent upon
lawyers, as an aspect of their obligation of fidelity to law, to respect this settlement and not act
directly on what they believe to be the public interest.

D.

Political Liberalism and Neutrality.

An alternative starting point for a theory of government lawyers’ ethics in the liberal state
would be to insist on the neutrality of the justification of some government action or policy. A
major preoccupation of scholars in the Rawlsian tradition is defining a standpoint from which the
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justice of political arrangements can be evaluated, which is somehow independent of the
competing comprehensive doctrines of the good about which individuals disagree. Or, as it is
sometimes stated, the aim of liberal theory is to justify the priority of the right over the good.137
Neutrality is a way of understanding some “distinction within morality between that part called
its conceptions of the good, which cannot be pursued politically, and the rest that can.”138 The
requirement of political neutrality can also be viewed as a constraint on the reasons that may be
offered in justification of an official state policy or action — for example, rights may be invoked,
but not conceptions of the good.139 (As Bruce Ackerman recognizes, a great deal hinges on how
this constraint on reasons that may be offered is formulated.140) The exclusion of conceptions of
the good is mean to base the justification of political institutions on considerations that all
affected citizens can endorse.141 In light of the diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines
of the good, it would be hopeless to seek a justification for government policies or actions that is
rooted in only one form of ethical life.142 For example, the familiar communitarian objection to
Rawls’s liberal theory of justice is that it (non-neutrally) excludes certain conceptions of the
good that can be realized only in the context of cultures that do not recognize the individual as
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the paramount source of value.143 A theory of political legitimacy needs some reason for making
these distinctions, which is not itself the sort of reason that is contested within the society.144

Not all liberal political philosophers believe that the state should be neutral between
competing conceptions of the good,145 but neutrality with respect to something nevertheless
remains an important ideal in political theory. It remains open, of course, to ask, neutrality with
respect to what? As Thomas Nagel, Joseph Raz, and others have pointed out, however, there is
really no way that the basic institutions of a society can be comprehensively neutral among
competing ideals.146 To take an obvious example, the mission of the Justice Department’s Civil
Rights division cannot be understood as being neutral on, say, whether workplace sexual
harassment counts as a violation of federal statutes prohibiting sex discrimination; only one view
of the meaning of “civil rights” is consistent with the function of the office. As this simple
example shows, any government action is bound to favor or disfavor the interests of some
individual or group. Neutrality is a puzzling ideal unless it is defined in terms of some other,
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more fundamental political value.147

A number of distinctive political values may be protected by the requirement of
neutrality. These values include negative liberty, in the sense of “freedom from political tutelage
in how to life”; tolerance; and political constitutionalism.148 Neutrality may also be understood
as responding to the fundamental political value of equality. As one influential definition of
liberalism stipulates, state officials must make political decisions on grounds that are
independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value
to life. Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government
does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another, either
because the officials believe that one is intrinsically superior, or because one is
held by the more numerous or powerful group.149
Liberalism is therefore linked tightly with the more fundamental political value of equality, and
the entitlement of all citizens to be treated with respect. The relationship between equality and
neutrality is that state policies and legal norms must be justified by considerations that are
neutral, in the sense that they do not favor or disfavor the interests of any individual or group
without an adequate justification. This “adequate justification,” in turn, must be in terms of
reasons that are accessible to all citizens, whatever their more comprehensive religious, cultural,
or philosophical commitments. According to Rawls, these so-called public reasons can be
endorsed from within a variety of comprehensive doctrines, leading to what he calls an
147
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overlapping consensus on the values that underpin the political order.150 The ideal of neutrality
is thus best understood in terms of the Rawlsian notion that political power must be justified by
public reasons in order to be legitimate.

The outlines of a public-reason-based theory of government lawyers’ ethics should be
reasonably clear: As state officials, who advise that state actions are consistent with the
impartial requirements of law, government lawyers act legitimately only insofar as they can offer
a justification that is acceptable to all citizens in light of principles they can reasonably endorse.
Notice that this is different from the position that government lawyers must act in the public
interest. Despite the similar terminology, a lawyer acting on the basis of public reasons would
not be required to determine whether citizens would regard a government act or policy as being
consistent with the public interest, because conceptions of the public interest belong to particular
comprehensive doctrines. Citizens may differ, on familiar Democrat/Republican lines, in their
views about what would be in the public interest, but may nonetheless be prepared to accept that
each of two incompatible actions is justifiable on the basis of reasons they both can share. The
reason is that, as Rawls emphasizes, the requirement of justification on the basis of public
reasons applies only to the basic structure of society — “its main political, social, and economic
institutions . . . elaborated in terms of fundamental political ideas viewed as implicit in the public
political culture of a democratic society.”151 This basic structure may have the effect of
excluding moral ideals as the basis for government decision-making, because those ideals have
been considered, and rejected, in the political process. The trick is, of course, to justify this
150
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exclusion on a non-circular basis. Political philosophers sometimes talk as though criteria of
legitimacy must be based on beliefs and commitments that are so rationally compelling that
someone would have to be barking mad to reject them. The thinnest set of proposition upon
which we could seek agreement are mathematical and logical truths — the principle of noncontradiction, 2 + 2 = 4, and so on. But if we thin out the set of reasons to the point that
everyone can be expected to share them, on the pain of being deemed crazy, they become too
thin to actually ground a decision concerning how political institutions ought to be structured.152
If all we can agree upon are mathematical and logical truths, we are not going to get very far in
the justification of political decisions. Something frankly normative is required, but of course
the normative argument must be capable of appealing to all affected citizens, despite their
commitments to other comprehensive doctrines.

What is required is, therefore, what Rawls would call an overlapping consensus on the
justification of a political conception of justice.153 This consensus is embedded within citizens’
comprehensive doctrines, but is not directly dependent upon them; in other words, it is a
freestanding political justification.154 As noted above, within some general constraints on what
counts as a consideration relevant to human morality, people can value different things, rank
competing values differently, and specify different principles of action on the basis of the same
abstract ethical value. The justification for the duty of fidelity to the law, which I have been
defending here, is therefore that people disagree in good faith about goods, rights, and justice,
151
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but that they also need to interact with one another on terms that are regulated by fair principles
of cooperation, rather than violence or deception. While people may have extra-political
attachments to various comprehensive doctrines that inform their views about the good and the
right, in politics citizens regard one another as free and equal, and seek a basis for cooperative
action. They have a reason to rely on tolerably fair procedures to enact a provisional settlement
of disagreement, in a way that is at least minimally respectful of the claims of others to be treated
as equals. This is a procedural conception of legitimacy, or what Hart referred to as the
“minimum content of natural law” — that is, norms that are necessarily part of any system that
claims to serve the purpose of enabling people to coordinate their affairs and live together
peaceably.155 This political conception owes its value to a broadly Kantian moral ideal — the
notion that “however much we may disagree with others and repudiate what they stand for, we
cannot treat them as merely objects of our will.”156

Notice, however, that the frankly normative part of this argument operates at the
“wholesale” level. The freestanding political values in question justify the legal system as a
whole, but do not come into play in ascertaining the content of particular laws. The Rawlsian
idea of an overlapping consensus does not require endorsement on the “retail” level of the values
underlying particular legal norms. The justification is for having a legal system that takes a
given form, which leaves as an open question the content of any resulting laws. As a result, one
may be deemed to have endorsed a law with which one disagrees, because of one’s prior
154
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endorsement (though generally hypothetical) endorsement of the system as a whole. The upshot
is that the normative universe of government lawyers is constituted by a restricted set of values.
The ethical obligations of a lawyer are not given by what would ordinarily be the moral values
applicable to a similarly situated non-professional, but by the values functionally related to the
particular institutional role. In the case of government lawyers, the requirement of neutrality
should not be taken to mean that it is impermissible to take sides on contested political matters, if
the matter has been resolved by law. To return to an earlier example, there may at one time have
been good faith disagreement over whether workplace sexual harassment counts as sex
discrimination, prohibited by federal statute. One that question was resolved in the affirmative
by the Supreme Court,157 a lawyer working for a federal civil rights agency, such as the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, is plainly not subject to criticism for “politicized”
advising if she gives advice that conforms to the Court’s decision. The overlap between the
content of that Court decision and some broader ideological agenda does not mean the lawyer’s
work on behalf of the agency’s mission is political. Or, if it is, it is appropriately political,
because the political values have been incorporated into the law.158
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In the end, the political ideal of liberal neutrality does not help with the project of
theorizing the “politicization” critique, because it leaves open the possibility of a substantial
overlap between the content of the law and a substantive ideological agenda. Neutrality is a
requirement only of a more general process of justification of the basic structure of society; it
does not apply to particular norms generated by that system. Thus, we will have to look
elsewhere for criteria that can be used to determine whether government lawyers have
impermissibly politicized their role.

III.

Fidelity in Interpretation as the Foundation of Government Lawyers’ Ethics.

There must be an alternative to, on the one hand, using terms like “politicization” merely
as terms of abuse to signify actions with which one disagrees, and on the other hand capitulating
to the view that there is no such thing as a faithful, neutral exposition of law. If the law were
perfectly determinate — that is, if there were only one right answer to any given question of law
— we could criticize government lawyers for politicizing their advice if it deviated from the
right answer in a way that favored the party in power. The basic responsibility of any lawyer —
whether in government or private practice — is to order her client’s affairs with respect to the
client’s legal entitlements. This basic responsibility can be contextualized, so that a lawyer in
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litigation may urge that the client’s entitlements be interpreted in a way that is the most favorable
to the client. In the advising context, the lawyer attempts to ascertain the boundaries of the
client’s entitlements, and then counsel the client to comply with the law. Even if one accepts this
vision of legal ethics in theory, however, a natural objection is that the boundaries of the client’s
entitlements is unclear; that is, the law is indeterminate to some extent. The evident fact of the
underdetermination of legal judgments by social sources can sometimes lend unwarranted
credence to CLS-style arguments attempting to cast doubt on the capacity of law to establish any
provisional settlements of normative controversy. The strong indeterminacy critique can then be
combined with the public choice notion that client interests are the most important thing in the
lawyer’s normative universe, creating an unholy alliance of cynical perspectives on the law. The
idea that the fundamental ethical obligation of lawyers is to exhibit fidelity to law thus seems
laughable.

I have argued that there is actually a great deal of determinacy in the law, but that lawyers
are often looking for it in all the wrong places. Interpretation is, by its nature, a communitybound practice, and the criteria for an acceptable interpretation are the property of interpretive
communities, not the thing to be interpreted.159 The difficulty with this reliance on interpretive
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communities is that there may be multiple overlapping or competing communities, which may
deem acceptable incompatible interpretations of the applicable legal materials. In that case, it
seems that one of two things must be true; either: (1) the existence of plural communities means
that any legal interpretation supported by a community of more than one lawyer, judge, or
scholar is plausibly legitimate; thus, no lawyer following that community’s interpretation can be
deemed to have impermissibly politicized her advice; or (2) there may be good or bad
interpretive communities, as judged with reference to some extra-community standard; thus, a
lawyer following the bad community may be deemed to have impermissibly politicized her
advice, if one can ascertain, using non-political criteria (such as the public interest), which are
the good and bad communities. Not surprisingly, I think (2) represents the right way of looking
at things. The idea of an interpretive community is not a jurisprudential primitive, so that there
is nothing more that one can say about an interpretation, beyond that it is acceptable to some
community. Instead, one can always appeal to extra-community standards related to the concept
of law as a purposive, reason-giving enterprise.

This discussion of communities may seem premature to someone who believes it is
possible to differentiate genuine legal entitlements from would-be rights by showing that a
genuine entitlement corresponds with something “out there” in the law somehow, like the text of
a statute or the intent of a legislative body.160 This is a natural tendency, since many people tend
160
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to have a folk epistemology that relies on some notion of correspondence between factual beliefs
and the furniture of the universe. However, there are fatal problems with correspondence
theories of truth, with respect both to propositions of law and as well as the most banal-looking
statements about the physical world. For example, suppose someone says the cat is on the mat,
and we wish to know whether the sentence “the cat is on the mat” is true. The correspondence
theory of truth says the statement is true if the proposition p (“the cat is on the mat”) corresponds
to a state of affairs in the world W (cat on mat), in some kind of appropriate correspondencerelationship C.161 Schematically, we can represent this truth condition as pCW. Now, have we
got it right? Does p correspond to W in the right way? This is to ask the question whether pCW
itself is true, which suggests there may be some property of the world WN to which pCW may or
may not correspond. (The inquiry needs to be set up this way to get at the nature of the
correspondence relationship, C. Cats and mats are one thing, and the words “cat” and “mat” are
another, so the next “world,” WN , is needed to represent some notion of correspondence in the
right way between “cat” and the cat, “mat” and the mat, and “on” and the relationship of the cat
and the mat to each other.) So pCW is true if pCWCWN. Then it is open for us to ask whether
pCWCWN is true. We are thus faced with another infinite regress problem, in which there is no
foundational fact-and-correspondence relationship about which we cannot in principle ask
whether it is true. Something else must serve as criteria of truth, such as correspondence with
other beliefs (i.e. a coherence account of truth), or a normative community practice of
manifesting agreement with the speaker who utters “there is a cat on the mat” under certain
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conditions. In other words, the correspondence relationship is impossible to pin down using only
the concept of correspondence.

In legal reasoning, the sentence “the judgment corresponds to the law” is itself
contestable, and the attempt to specify truth conditions for that sentence leads us down the same
path of infinite regress. One reason for this is that in law, the specification of the relevant
“world,” W, in the correspondence relationship, pCW, includes more than texts. The world with
which a proposition of law must correspond also includes non-textual principles, practices, and
standards for evaluating legal arguments, such as criteria of relevant similarity in analogical
arguments. If the relevant world consisted only of texts, the law would be unacceptably static. It
is not difficult — and can be quite amusing — to collect examples of confident predictions by
judges and scholars that the law will always including such-and-such a rule, and then show that
those judgments were proven spectacularly wrongheaded by subsequent developments. For
example, Sanford Levinson quotes this categorical pronouncement by two prominent law
professors, made in 1965:
[T]here is no substantial likelihood that any court will act today, as a matter of
common law development, to substitute comparative negligence for an existing
rule of contributory negligence in the general accident field. Indeed, lawyers will
not even consider arguing this possibility to a court.162
In less than 20 years, however, the leading torts treatise noted that “[t]he principle of
comparative fault apportionment of damages is veritably sweeping the land, gobbling up much
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traditional tort doctrine as it goes.”163 Similarly, Judge Cardozo’s famous MacPherson decision
imposed liability on the defendant on the basis of reasoning that in all likelihood would have
been deemed a long-shot at best by the lawyer representing the plaintiff.164 And, of course, at
one time it would have been deemed a frivolous argument to contend that the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibited “separate but equal” public schooling,165 or that the
dormant commerce clause would prevent states from enacting prohibitions on carrying firearms
near public schools,166 or that the United States Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional.167
That history may be taken wrongly to suggest that there is no such thing as a frivolous argument,
but I believe instead that there is an objectively determinate category of frivolous interpretations.
What accounts for that? The reason an argument for the adoption of comparative fault would not
be frivolous, but it would be frivolous to argue that the federal income tax is unconstitutional
because the Sixteenth Amendment was not properly ratified (a favorite argument of kooky tax
protesters168), is that there were underlying principles of tort law that pointed the way toward
comparative fault, even while the “black letter” rule in most jurisdictions was contributory
negligence. Similarly, the decision in Brown was anticipated by other equal protection decisions,
based on existing constitutional principles, that showed a developing trend in the law toward the
rejection of Plessy and the separate-but-equal doctrine.

163

W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 479 (5th ed. 1984).
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 75 & n. 18 (1977) (noting that in MacPherson, Judge
Cardozo “imposed liability on defendants who would almost certainly . . . not have been held liable if anyone but
Cardozo had been stating and analyzing the prior case law which the majority opinion purported to follow.”).
165
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reversing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
166
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
167
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
168
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1986).
164

65

The existence of principles and interpretive conventions not only expands the legal
“world,” W, but it makes it difficult to formalize the correspondence relationship, C. Except in
cases where a decision follows from subsuming facts under a clear legal rule, an interpreter
justifies a legal judgment by showing that it is coherent with existing law, in the sense that the
decision is supportable by the whole body of existing law including, where applicable, cases,
statutes, regulations, and the principles that underlie and make sense of those norms.169 The law
sets boundaries on what counts as a legitimate interpretation. A judge could not cite his
dyspepsia (perhaps resulting from what he had for breakfast) as a reason for denying bail to a
criminal defendant, for the obvious reason that the judge’s bodily health does not count as part of
the law. That is obviously an unrealistically easy case, but when we move to the more difficult
cases, the analysis is the same — if judges have a practice of treating certain considerations as
bearing on the outcome of decisions, then they are part of the law. Even if there is not this kind
of uncertainty at the margins, over whether some consideration counts as part of the law, there
will often be a plurality of competing legal reasons pointing in different directions. Both parties
in a typical dispute can probably cite legal reasons, including principles of various weights and
priorities, in support of their position. If this were not the case, the matter probably would have
settled, or the lawsuit would not have been brought in the first place. Thus, while the materials
of law — the stuff that is “out there” in some sense — sets boundaries on what may be adduced
as a reason for or against some interpretation, there is no avoiding the exercise of judgment.

Judgment, in turn, is not some mysterious faculty or a black box in interpretation, out of
169
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which a result pops as needed. As Anthony Kronman rightly points out, a person characterized
by good judgment “is not someone who from time to time merely makes certain strikingly
appropriate oracular pronouncements.”170 Rather, a person of good judgment can, if called upon
to do so, provide a reasoned explanation of her decision. The reasoned explanation makes
reference to the social sources underlying legal justification, but the social sources do not
exhaust the reasoning process. Rather, it is a community-bound enterprise, in which the criteria
for reasonable exercise of judgment are elaborated intersubjectively, among members of
professional interpretive community.171 These criteria are available to provide a justification of a
decision.172 This justification is a public phenomenon, in the sense that the interpreter is
appealing to shared community standards for evaluating the appropriateness of interpretation. In
this way, the interpreter’s discretion is constrained by public norms regulating the understanding
of the social sources of law. Of course, the problem of a plurality of social sources of the law,
which can be addressed by relying on a community’s norms governing interpretation, is
replicated at another level if there is a plurality of interpretive communities, each purporting to
aim at ascertaining the content of the law, and which may prioritize and balance the relevant
internal legal reasons differently. We would then want to know which community’s tacit norms
should count, when a lawyer is asking herself whether the judgment is legitimate.

I will argue that there are criteria which may be employed to evaluate a community in
terms of its commitment to the value of fidelity to law. The most basic constraint on what counts
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170
Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 848 (1987).
171
See Fiss, supra note ___.

67

as a plausible interpretation of law is that law must be viewed as a purposive activity, as having
some point or end.173 One might also say that legal argumentation is a craft, which carries with
it internal standards of excellence which are related to the ends served by the craft. Ethical
lawyering is interpreting the law and applying it in the representation of one’s clients, with
fidelity to the craft of legal reasoning in a professional community. The normative ideal of a
craft, which cuts through the plurality of interpretive communities, depends on the assumption
that legal interpretation is a process of reasoned elaboration. Fundamentally, in order to
represent a legitimate interpretive community, a cluster of would-be legal interpreters must be
dedicated to the process of understanding the meaning of legal norms as a reasoned settlement of
normative controversy, not simply as positions that can be won or lost in a political contest.

To illustrate this argument, return to the example of the FISA case discussed in Section
II.A. One of remarkable aspects of this story is that the President decided to continue with the
warrantless wiretapping program, and changed his mind only after Comey, who was serving as
Acting Attorney General, threatened to resign, along with then-OLC head Jack Goldsmith, the
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director of the FBI, and several top officials at the Justice Department.174 For the purposes of the
discussion of legal interpretation, imagine the President’s legal decision before the threat of mass
resignations. His top legal advisors had concluded that the wiretapping program was illegal.
However, the same office had previously concluded that the program was legal, based on former
OLC lawyer John Yoo’s arguments for virtually limitless presidential power. There were
lawyers elsewhere in the executive branch, most notably then-White House Counsel Alberto
Gonzales and David Addington, the legal advisor to Vice-President Dick Cheney, who continued
to believe that the President had authority to authorize the program.175 Therefore, from the
President’s perspective there appeared to be two interpretive communities — the Yoo/Addington
camp and the Goldsmith/Ashcroft camp — reaching diametrically opposed interpretations of the
governing law. Leaving aside the matter of the competence of a non-legally trained President to
evaluate these arguments independently, the central question is whether there is any standard,
beyond the existence of an interpretive community, governing the acceptability of an
interpretation of law. In this case, it appears to have been sufficient, from the President’s point
of view, that some group of lawyers, no matter how small or out of the mainstream, was willing
to state that his preferred position had legal support. Unless we are willing to endorse the
President’s decision in this case, and conclude that it is enough that a few lawyers in the
Yoo/Addington camp have blessed his preferred interpretation of the governing law, we will be
looking for some principled way to conclude that the Yoo/Addington interpretation is not the
right one.
174
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One possibility is that the relevant criteria are quasi-empirical ones. Recall Hart’s claim
that social practices are at the root of the authority of law. As Hart argued, it is conceptually
necessary for there to be a legal system (as opposed to a fortuitous convergence of behavior) that
judges take a critical reflective attitude toward certain considerations, and regard them as
creating genuine obligations. Law is conventional at its root, but it is a particular kind of
convention — a discipline of practical reasoning.176 Legal argumentation is a matter of making
reasons intelligible to others, in a context of public justification.177 The criteria that pick out an
interpretation as being part of law, as opposed to politics, morality, or the personal preferences of
judges are given by the internal standards of a particular kind of social practice, namely that of
legal reasoning.178 But the demand for a reasoned justification arises from the nature of a legal
system, not from any specific role within in. If an interpretive community becomes too small,
too isolated, too idiosyncratic, the publicity condition for the systematicity of law no longer
holds, and a would-be interpretation of law becomes merely a private view about what the law
ought to be. However, this approach must include more than a straightforward comparison of
the size of the membership of competing interpretive communities. (That is why I say the
question is quasi-empirical, rather than empirical-full-stop.) Granting that Addington and Yoo
are actually just about the only advocates of the extremely strong vision of executive power
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pursued by the administration, and that in many cases their position was vigorously opposed by
conservative lawyers within the administration,179 a nose-counting strategy apparently runs into
the Sorites problem.180 If we know the Yoo/Addington view is implausible because there are
only two lawyers supporting it, how many must we add to the ranks of supporters before the
view becomes plausible? To avoid this problem, it may be necessary to specify frankly
normative criteria, relating to the nature of legal reasoning as a craft. I will suggest what these
normative criteria may be, but in the end will argue for as thin a conception of community
legitimacy as possible — that is, one that seeks, to a significant extent, to make the analysis of
legitimacy quasi-empirical.

It would obviously be circular to use criteria relating to the meaning of law to define the
legitimacy of an interpretive community, since my argument has been that the meaning of law is
a function of not only social sources but also of the tacit norms regulating interpretation, which
are a property of professional interpretive communities. I have also rejected a straightforward
nose-counting strategy, for the reason that there may be an interpretive community that is
numerically the minority, but which has done better at interpreting the law. (How do we even
know what it means to “do better” if meaning is in part a property of communities? It is easy to
fall back into circularity!) The only way to avoid begging all of questions here is to rely on a
notion of the law as a practice, and seek to derive from that a set of internal criteria of success or
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failure in terms of the ends of the practice. David Luban reads Lon Fuller as proposing
something along these lines.181 The distinctive feature of Fuller’s jurisprudence is that he defines
law not in terms of existence conditions, but as an activity — “the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules.”182 As an activity, it can be carried out well or
poorly. In Luban’s arresting phrase, “lawyers can sin against the enterprise in which they are
engaged.”183 Marking deviations from a well-performed activity is a matter of grasping the point
of the practice, to see what sorts of commitments it entails. Law, in other words, is a purposive
activity, and we can give a functional argument for the ethical obligations that attach to anyone
who participates in it. “[T]o recognize something as a steam engine or a light switch is already
to recognize what it ought to do, to recognize a built-in standard of success or failure.”184
Similarly, understanding the point of some practice carries with it the implicit acceptance of
internal regulative standards that enable that practice to aim at its end.

This is a familiar Aristotelian way of thinking, and the objections to it are just as familiar.
Functional arguments place a great deal of analytical weight on the function we impute to some
object or activity.185 In a standard example in the philosophy of science, how do we know that
the function of the heart is to pump blood, and not to make a thumping sound? One typical
181
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response is to define a function in terms of the proper working of a system such as a biological
organism. But of course this just pushes the problem back one step, to defining the proper
working of something. Concepts like adaptive fitness can be used to define the proper working
of organisms, but in the case of social practices like law there is not such a clear external referent
which can be used to define the function of the practice. Fuller says the function of law is
subjecting human activity to the governance of rules, but one might also argue that the function
of law is to ensure that justice is done, protect human rights,186 limit the power of the state,
express the community’s public values,187 enable the little guy to stand up to the big guy and say,
“hey, you can’t do that to me,”188 and so on. Not surprisingly, I have my own views about the
best way to understand the function of law, but I offer them somewhat tentatively, as a view
about the function of law. If one finds this view attractive, then certain things follow from it, as
a matter of the internal normativity of that practice (which is to say, as principles of legal ethics).
If another functional account seems more attractive, then different internal normative standards
will follow from it.

As mentioned previously, I think the function of the legal system (writ large, including
legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies, as well as roles or offices within the system,
such as lawyer and judge, and rhetorical practices that constitute the distinctive mode of

Phil. Rev. 139 (1973).
186
See, e.g., Thomas Bingham (Baron of Cornhill), The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67 (2007).
187
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986) (talking in terms of a community of principle, not
public values, but making essentially the same point); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1986).
188
One way of understanding the defense of the rule of law in E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS:
THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT 258-69 (1975). I owe the colloquial formulation to Yasutomo Morigiwa, but he
has published it only in Japanese.

73

justification of directives given by the system) is to enable citizens to establish, using tolerably
fair procedures, a provisional framework for peaceful coexistence and cooperation, despite the
evident fact of deep and persistent disagreement, pertaining to just about everything that
otherwise could serve as a framework.189 If the law is to perform this function, it must be the
sort of thing that is capable of establishing an autonomous domain of legal entitlements, the
content of which may be ascertained without resort to the kinds of moral reasons about which
there is disagreement. Entitlements are further to be differentiated from mere client interests, as
well as the fortuity of not having been punished for some conduct, through evasion, deception,
luck, or the exercise of raw power. More specifically, “X has a legal entitlement to N” means
both:
(1)

X is acting under a claim of right that is established in the name of the political
community as a whole. And

(2)

X is saying more than, “I can get away with N’ing.”

Thus, at a minimum, we can identify what is wrong with the directive attributed to Andrew
Jackson, that “You must find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney General who
will.”190 The problem is that Jackson’s stance conflates lawful power with raw power. (It could
be understood as an appeal to the indeterminacy of law,191 but I think it is better understood as
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simply a threat.) In most cases, however, principle (1) will be the more important basis for
differentiating among interpretive communities that claim to be legitimate. The idea of an
entitlement established in the name of the society as a whole presupposes a certain underlying
rationality to the regime of laws enacted by the society. A legal norm is a substantive position,
arrived at through debate and deliberation, not through some arbitrary process like flipping a
coin. Indeed, the authority of legal norms depends on their reflecting the reasons that citizens
had for acting, prior to the resolution of disagreement by the legal process.192 An arbitrary,
arational process of settling disputes would not be entitled to respect by the purported subjects of
its authority.193 That means that interpreting and applying laws is a reasoned activity, and
interpretive communities can do better or worse as reasoners.

This may be starting to sound mysterious, but it is only mysterious as a theoretical
problem. As a description of a practical activity, it is perfectly intelligible. Identifying good or
bad instances of legal reasoning is exactly what lawyers do. The standards of lawyering craft
resist distillation into summary form, but experienced lawyers nevertheless can recognize well
reasoned judgments or instances of fallacious argumentation. To continue our domestic spying
example, one can criticize the government lawyers’ advice to the Bush administration,
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authorizing the warrantless wiretapping program on the basis of the AUMF and wartime
executive power, with reference to the failure of that advice to cohere with existing law.194 First
of all, the FISA statute contemplates a situation of war, and permits warrantless wiretapping
during wartime, but only for a limited period of time.195 Under ordinary principles of statutory
construction,196 this specific limitation on wiretapping in a time of war would control over the
general grant of power in the AUMF. Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that where
Congress has spoken with regard to an issue, the President’s authority is at its lowest ebb, even
in wartime.197 That rule pertains not only to the open-ended claims of executive power in the
lawyers’ letter, but to the interpretation of conflicting statutes, such as the AUMF and FISA.
Congress has acted to regulate the President’s authority to conduct electronic surveillance, and
the AUMF does not change that specific regulation in any way. From the standpoint of
proponents of strong executive power, the AUMF should be seen as redundant in any event, so it
cannot change the regulatory scheme adopted by FISA without specifically amending FISA. The
government lawyers might respond that the President has the authority to disregard
Congressional restrictions — at one time the Office of Legal Counsel took that position with
respect to prohibitions on torture198 — but the Justice Department wisely chose not to make that
argument in this case, because it is wholly lacking in legal support.
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“Wait a minute!” a reader might respond. “You are saying that an argument should not
be relied upon because it lacks legal support, but you have defined legal support in terms of
interpretive communities, and we know that there is an interpretive community that believes the
President does have the authority to disregard Congressional regulation in wartime. You are
ruling that out as a legitimate argument only because you dislike the substantive result, not
because it is inadequately supported.” In response to this line of objection, it would be necessary
to go through the same process, in order to demonstrate that there is no adequate legal basis for
the conclusion that the President has the authority to ignore statutory limitations on his conduct.
Again, although interpretive communities are at the center of this process of argumentation,
communities are not jurisprudential primitives. There are standards for evaluating some
interpretive communities as being dedicated to the process of recovering the meaning of a legal
norm, with the assumption that legal argumentation is essentially a process of reason-giving. But
now my imaginary interlocutory is becoming increasingly agitated. “The lawyers gave reasons
why the President should be permitted to disregard Congressional limitations, and there is an
interpretive community of lawyers who find those reasons persuasive.” The problem with this
response is, upon closer scrutiny it turns out that the reasons they gave are not the sorts of
reasons that make reference to what the law actually is, but to what the lawyers think the law
ought to be. The underlying theoretical argument in this paper is a frankly normative defense of
legal positivism. This is not an oxymoron; rather, it is the idea that there is something
normatively attractive about having a way of organizing social cooperation that precludes
reference to the sorts of evaluative debates that we find intractable. That procedural resolution of
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disagreement must be faithful to some extent to the underlying matters that citizens care about.
It must take them into account, but also yield directives that supersede these underlying reasons.
The legal system thus embodies a process of reasoning, but an autonomous one — it is reasoning
with respect to particular kinds of reasons. These are the reasons picked out as part of law, by
content-independent criteria, by virtue of their social sources (if you like, in reliance on a Hartian
rule of recognition). Lawyers participate in the craft of reasoning on the basis of certain social
sources but not others, taking certain considerations as part of the law and excluding others. If a
would-be interpretive community tries to incorporate different norms, it may be criticized as
engaging in something other than the process of trying to recover the meaning of the law, as
settled by authoritative procedures.

IV.

Conclusion.

I realize there are difficult jurisprudential questions lurking just beneath the surface of
this argument. For example, Ronald Dworkin insists that the justification of a conclusion of law
must reach out beyond social sources to incorporate, or at least cohere with, the community’s
underlying principles of political morality.199 For Dworkin there can be no purely source-based,
content-independent criteria for identifying the law. One might put this Dworkinian point in
historical terms by observing the process of legal change, referencing cases familiar to everyone,
like Brown v. Board of Education, or those known only to lawyers, such as Cardozo’s decision in
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MacPherson.200 Positivists have given different answers to this line of objection; Hart’s
response, that judges simply make law at the point when source-based legal norms run out, is
well known.201 Legal systems also contain internal rules respecting the process of evolution,
self-correction, and even reversal; there is an entire body of Supreme Court doctrine on
overruling its own precedent, for example. These jurisprudential issues can be restated in
connection with the critique of the government lawyers’ advice on domestic spying as follows:
Who is to say that the radical executive power view is non-law, as opposed to nascent law that
has been recognized by an exceptionally prescient group of lawyers, just as Cardozo was the first
to grasp the evolving principles of manufacturer liability to consumers?

The answer to this objection can be stated in terms that have been suggested above, with
respect to the context in which a lawyer offers an interpretation of law. Suppose there is a novel
interpretation of law — akin to the reversal of the separate-but-equal principle or the abolition of
the privity doctrine. The novelty of that position can be ascertained by observing either that (1) a
numerically large interpretive community rejects it, or (2) it is accepted only by a numerically
small interpretive community. In this way, the novel interpretation is like the strong executive
power view urged by Yoo and Addington. I would be willing to bite the bullet and state that the
position is illegitimate, because the interpretive community is numerically in the minority, but
only where the interpretation is being offered as the basis for advice on what the client —
whether a private client or a government actor — is legally authorized to do. Recall the
expressivist argument above. To the extent a lawyer seeks to justify her client’s conduct with
200
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reference to the discourse of legality, she is constrained to rely on relatively mainstream
interpretive community views. In litigation, on the other hand, a lawyer is permitted to urge the
tribunal to accept a novel interpretation. It does not matter that only a tiny interpretive
community accepts the interpretation, because the tribunal is free to reject it. On the other hand,
it may accept it, believing it better to cohere with the community’s political morality, or
whatever. Courts have the power to make these sorts of determinations — to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law — and lawyers are legally permitted to make these arguments.202 But
nothing follows from this permission when lawyers are advising clients on what the law is, as
opposed to what it should (or might) be. In that case, fidelity to law requires either advising on
mainstream interpretations of the law, or open disobedience in a way that exposes the client’s
conduct to scrutiny and checking by other institutions.

The “politicization” critique can therefore be restated in terms of the value of legality, so
that we can approve or disapprove of the advice given by government lawyers according to how
much they respect the existing legal settlement, as opposed to trying to make an end run around
existing law to act on the basis of the policy preferences of elected officials. This position denies
that the job of government lawyers is simply to enact the policy preferences of incumbent
officials, but it also denies that government lawyering is a locus for the contestation of legal
meaning. There are plenty of avenues provided by the legal system for dialogic engagement and
jurisgenerative politics. The system as a whole must respond to the need for flexibility and
permitting citizen engagement. However, that response should not take the form of constructing
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a conception of government lawyers’ ethics that emphasizes values other than fidelity to law.
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